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Despite being a large and relatively closed
economy in comparison to its individual
member countries, the euro area economy is
more open than other large economies. Its
exports of goods and services to the rest of the
world are equivalent to around 20% of nominal
GDP compared with about 10% and 13% for the
United States and Japan respectively. It might,
therefore, be conjectured that one of the
reasons for the weak growth recently observed
in the euro area could be found in an
unsatisfactory performance of exports. In turn,
the latter might be presumed to result from the
increasing role in international trade of new
world players, which seems to have affected
the export market shares of several developed
economies, including some of the largest euro
area countries. The motivation of this report
is therefore to provide: (i) a comprehensive
assessment of the export performance of the
euro area and the euro area countries, both
from a historical perspective and relative to
major competitors; and (ii) a review of some
of the factors underlying this performance,
such as: price, technological and structural
competitiveness; the product and geographical
composition of euro area exports and world
demand; as well as FDI activity and the related
internationalisation of euro area production.
OVERALL ASSESSMENT
Following the entrance of new world players –
most notably Asian emerging economies as
well as new EU Member States – developed
economies have lost export market shares since
the early 1990s, at times substantially. In this
respect, the losses for the euro area as a whole
were smaller in comparison to the decline in
export market shares experienced by some of
its major competitors, namely the United States
and particularly Japan. This may be surprising
considering that this report finds that euro area
exports are relatively more specialised in
medium-tech products, where competition
from new low-cost entrants may be expected to
be fiercer. The United States and Japan instead
are comparatively more specialised in high-
tech exports, which are intrinsically more
dynamic. A number of factors have contributed
to the relative resilience of the euro area export
share. First, the growth of world demand for
medium-tech products remained robust, while
the relatively faster growth of demand for high-
tech products, which boosted US exports
during most of the 1990s, sharply decelerated
in the early 2000s. Second, the export shares of
the United States and Japan are relatively more
exposed to competition from the dynamic
Asian exporters – most notably China. Third,
the loss of price competitiveness experienced
by the euro area since the early 1990s was
relatively modest, due partly to the large
depreciation of the euro’s exchange rate up to
2001. In this context, the profit-smoothing
behaviour of exporters over time also limited
the impact of the most recent euro appreciation
on euro area competitiveness. Fourth, the
losses in market shares experienced by some
competitors seem to be the result of strategic
choices concerning the localisation of
production. In particular, Japan substantially
increased the use of South-East Asian countries
as export platforms to the rest of the world,
a strategy which turned out to be export-
diverting for Japan. By contrast, the
outsourcing of production to the new EU
Member States by countries such as Germany
has been export-enhancing for the euro area. In
this connection, it is important to bear in mind
that, as production processes are undergoing
substantial transformations associated with the
internationalisation of manufacturing, export
market shares as indicators of relative export
performance across countries may become less
meaningful.
The trends in euro area exports over this
particular sample period should not be a cause
for complacency, particularly as more recently
the euro area has experienced losses in export
market share. Furthermore, the medium-tech
specialisation of the euro area might pose a risk
for the future, particularly if the high-tech8
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sectors were to grow relatively faster and
competition from new entrants in medium-tech
products were to become fiercer, both in terms
of costs and in terms of quality. In this respect,
the euro area was found to be lagging its major
competitors with regard to measures of
technological and structural competitiveness.
Some current individual country developments
within the euro area may be foreshadowing the
potential risks associated with euro area
weakness in these areas.
Indeed, the export performance of the euro area
is the outcome of some rather different
developments at the country level. Germany,
France and the Netherlands appear to have
shaped the euro area export performance
throughout the period, although German export
performance has excelled relative to the others
in recent years. The latter took place during a
period of particularly weak domestic demand in
Germany and is partly the result of a spillover of
substantial FDI activity, particularly in the new
EU Member States, as well as successful
ongoing industrial restructuring. Meanwhile,
some euro area countries are experiencing clear
losses in market shares as a result of the product
and market specialisation of their exports, as
well as poor price and non-price
competitiveness. A clear case is Italy, whose
exports suffered from fierce and direct
competition from both the new EU Member
States and Asia, combined with weak
technological competitiveness. By contrast,
Spanish exports have been more dynamic than
the average, favourably affected for a prolonged
period by integration effects related to Spain’s
accession to the European Union as well as
relatively low levels of export prices and labour
costs compared with competitors.
Finally, the evidence provided by the report
shows that price competitiveness and foreign
demand can to a considerable extent explain
export developments at the euro area level.
This is however not always the case at the
country level, where some of the other factors
mentioned above also need to be taken into
account to explain export developments.
In more detail, the report arrives at the
following findings.
THE PRODUCT AND GEOGRAPHICAL
COMPOSITION OF EURO AREA EXPORTS
The report finds that the geographical structure
of euro area exports shows an “under-
specialisation” in fast-growing markets (such
as Asian markets) and a “specialisation” in
European markets, which are growing
relatively slowly with the exception of the new
EU Member States. Also, and somewhat
contrary to expectations, the specialisation of
the euro area in medium-tech products, which
account for almost half of euro area exports
compared with a third for world exports, helped
to support export performance as world
demand in medium-tech sectors maintained a
robust pace of growth. By contrast, the euro
area was unable to capitalise fully on the
relatively faster growth of world demand in the
high-tech sectors over much of the sample
period as high-tech products only represent
about one-fifth of euro area exports, compared
with almost one-third of world exports. At the
same time, euro area exporters benefited from
being less exposed to the volatility of the high-
tech sector associated with the technology




Among other factors affecting export
performance, technological and structural
competitiveness are frequently mentioned in the
literature. Somewhat surprisingly, such
indicators appear to have had only a limited
impact in the case of the euro area, despite the
report’s findings that the euro area seems to
underperform relative to major competitors
according to these measures of competitiveness.
The report analyses only a small sub-set of such
indicators, but the results are rather coherent
across the different measures. Regarding
technological competitiveness, R&D intensity
in total manufacturing in the United States and9
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Japan is about 50% higher than in the euro area.
Both patenting and R&D data show that most of
the euro area’s innovation occurs in medium-
technology-intensive sectors, while the share of
the high-tech sectors is substantially below that
of the United States and Japan. With respect to
structural competitiveness, the report looks at
two indicators, i.e. educational attainment and
the business environment. Although the
information content of these indicators might be
questioned as they might suffer from
comparability problems and may reflect purely
subjective judgements as some are based on
surveys, both seem to indicate that the euro area
is on average in a less favourable position than
its main competitors. Labour regulations and
relatively heavy taxation, both of households
and businesses, are identified as the prime
source of disadvantage, inhibiting technological
innovation and ultimately possibly hurting
export performance. However, further research
is needed in order to investigate the link between
structural competitiveness and export performance.
To some extent, the relative stability of euro area
exports – despite the euro area’s
underperformance in technological and
structural competitiveness – is due to the specific
developments over the chosen sample period,
particularly the robust and stable world demand
for medium-tech products in contrast to the
stronger, but more volatile, growth in the high-
tech export market. If the world demand for high-
tech products had continued to grow as rapidly as
in the mid-to-late 1990s, the export share of the
euro area may have declined more rapidly in
recent years. Accordingly, looking forward, the
product composition of euro area exports could
be a future source of weakness particularly as
new world players such as China seem to be
catching-up with the euro area in terms of product
sophistication and may pose a serious threat to
market share in the coming years.
FDI AND TRADE
The report attributes a critical role to FDI
(foreign direct investment) activity and related
economic phenomena in explaining euro area
export developments, particularly for some
individual euro area countries. In order to
understand how FDI by multinational
enterprises affects trade dynamics and
ultimately export performance, outward FDI is
divided into two broad categories. The first,
“horizontal” FDI, is in other developed
economies – largely in the form of Mergers and
Aquisitions (M&As) – and is partly driven by
the desire of euro area firms to absorb and
acquire new technologies, most notably in the
United States. These strategic M&As are
identified as possibly making up for the slack in
the technological competitiveness of euro area
exports mentioned previously, although the
evidence on whether this type of FDI is actually
trade-enhancing is mixed. The second category
is “vertical” FDI, such as in new EU Member
States, which is mostly aimed at exploiting low
labour costs through the internationalisation of
production. Here, the impact on trade is more
direct and it is positive. It has mostly involved
Austrian, Dutch and particularly German
firms, which have shifted some parts of the
production process to the new EU Member
States and now import intermediate
manufacturing goods from these countries,
while exports have also benefited. The
counterpart of higher euro area trade with the
new EU Member States (as yet external to the
euro area) has been a decline in the share in
intra-euro area trade of some euro area
countries. A second impact is that extending
the chain of production internationally implies
that euro area exports have become more
reliant on imported inputs, which is consistent
with the increase in the import content of euro
area exports from around 38% in 1995 to 44%
in 2000, therefore lowering the value added per
export unit. While finding evidence of this
latter phenomenon across the euro area
countries, the report concludes that the value
added in the export industry remains relatively
high. Finally, FDI inflows into the euro area are
an additional source for enhancing the euro
area’s export performance. An important
example of such activities are the FDI flows to
Ireland, largely undertaken to create an export
platform to reach third markets.10
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POSSIBLE RISKS
Complacency regarding euro area exports
should be avoided as the more recent and
ongoing significant losses in euro area export
market share, combined with divergences in
export performance across the euro area
countries, suggest that exports remain
vulnerable. In particular, the recent strong
export growth of Germany has been offset by a
rather weak  export performance by some of the
other euro area countries. Looking forward, the
under-specialisation of the euro area in the
potentially faster-growing high-tech sectors
represents a possible risk of future export
underperformance. From this perspective, and
bearing in mind its well-known structural
rigidities, the key question is whether the euro
area can in the future move rapidly and flexibly
towards sectors which are expanding in terms
of both exports and innovation. As regards FDI
and outsourcing, although these have helped to
foster the euro area’s export performance, this
may not necessarily continue to be the case in
the future. In particular, the outsourcing
process related to vertical FDI may represent
an eventual future source of weakness for euro
area trade, should the Japanese experience of
transferring larger shares of manufacturing
abroad, and the associated declines in export
share, represent the way forward. However,
under this scenario, euro area GNP may be
enhanced once the earnings from those
investments and the senior staff employed
abroad in connection with the subsidiaries and
affiliates are taken into account. Although
there may be significant adjustment costs in the
short run, the overall welfare implications of a
process that reallocates internationally the
production of goods and services should be
beneficial in the longer run, given that
production is assumed to move according to
comparative advantages.
POLICY
Against the background of rapid changes in the
structure of both euro area exports and world
trade, various aspects of export developments
need to be closely monitored within the
economic analysis underlying the ECB’s
assessment of price stability over the medium
term, particularly given the more recent
deterioration in export performance suggested
by the decline in export market share since
2002. In this context, the findings of the report
provide policy-makers with critical inputs
regarding: (i) issues related to the product and
geographical specialisation of euro area
exports; (ii) divergences in export performance
across the euro area countries due to
differences in price as well as technological
and structural competitiveness; and (iii)
changes in the relationships between exports,
imports and domestic activity resulting from
outsourcing and the internationalisation of
production.
Finally, the report indicates that further
structural reforms in the labour and product
markets of the euro area countries are
necessary in order to cope with the challenges
arising from globalisation and to speed up the
adjustment process, thereby enhancing the
ability of euro area firms to move flexibly
towards expanding sectors, as well as helping
to contain cost pressures and improve
competitiveness. The globalisation of
production is already having an impact on cost
developments in the euro area, although with
differences across countries, and the growth
and price impacts of this transition phase need
to be carefully observed.
STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT
Chapter 1 provides an overview and assessment
of the price competitiveness and export
performance of the euro area and the larger euro
area countries, as well as an evaluation of how
standard equations have been able to explain
actual export developments. Chapter 2 carries
out a constant market share analysis for the
euro area and thereby sheds light on the reasons
for movements in aggregate export market
shares by looking at the sectoral and
geographical composition of euro area exports.
Chapter 3 looks at the evolution of the11
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technological competitiveness of the euro area
and major competitors – proxied by patenting
activity and R&D expenditure – and analyses
some structural indicators of competitiveness
using survey data. Chapter 4 then looks at the
impact of FDI on competitiveness and export
performance. Finally, Chapter 5 summarises
the main findings of the report, but also
critically evaluates their importance and
implications.12
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1 EURO AREA EXPORT PERFORMANCE AND
PRICE COMPETITIVENESS1
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to provide an
overview of recent developments in the export
performance and price competitiveness of
the euro area. While gauging the export
performance of the euro area against the
benchmark of major competitors, we assess the
extent to which price competitiveness and
foreign demand explain export behaviour, or
whether other factors, broadly defined as non-
price competitiveness, should also be taken
into account. An analysis for the five largest
euro area countries is also carried out in order
to provide an indication of divergences in
export performance across the individual euro
area countries.
1.2 THE EURO AREA AND ITS MAJOR
COMPETITORS
1.2.1 EXPORT MARKET SHARES FOR THE EURO
AREA AND MAJOR COMPETITORS
Taking into account “third-market effects”2,
the three major export competitors of the euro
area are the United States, the United Kingdom
and Japan.3 In order to ascertain how the euro
area has performed with respect to these main
competitors we look at the relative evolution of
its export market share.
Measuring market shares is not a
straightforward task, since a number of
different indicators can be used, each measure
having its own merits and, therefore, deserving
some analysis. For example, developments in
export shares expressed in volume terms may
have a bearing on real GDP growth and can be
expected to react directly to changes in price
competitiveness. Meanwhile, developments in
export shares in value terms contain
information about the potential import “buying
power” of an economy and can stem from
changes either in export volumes or in relative
prices. In this chapter the analysis is mostly
restricted to developments in market shares in
volume terms, while later in the report we will
look at export shares in terms of values due to
their availability at a more detailed level (Box 1
at the end of this chapter describes the various
concepts of export market share used in this
report). Moreover, the market share can be
computed as a total indicator (i.e. the share of a
country’s exports in the total market for
exports4), or as an indicator that weights the
geographical export markets according to their
importance in the exports of the country under
analysis.5 Therefore, the latter measure is the
one that will mostly be used in this chapter6,
while Chapter 2 uses the total measure in order
to evaluate the impact of the geographical and
product composition of exports on market
share.
Overall, when compared with its major
competitors, the euro area accounts for the
largest share of world exports and has
experienced a relatively smaller decline in
export market share since the early 1990s.
Chart 1 shows the shares of world exports in
terms of both values and volumes for the euro
area and major competitors. In value terms, the
euro area accounted for 23% of world exports
of goods and services in 2003, followed by the
United States (14%), Japan (8%), and the
1 By  Filippo di Mauro and Laurent Maurin, with contributions
from Thomas Warmedinger.
2 Third-market effects capture the competition faced by euro
area exporters in foreign markets by exporters from third
countries.
3 The weights in the nominal effective exchange rate (EER) of
the euro capture the effect of competition in third markets. The
EER-23 index, which is based on 23 partner countries, shows
that the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan have the
largest weights of 26.19, 19.18 and 11.45 respectively.
Meanwhile, China has the fourth largest weight of 6.93. These
weights were published in the September 2004 issue of the
ECB’s Monthly Bulletin.
4 In the case of a large country, the total market for exports is
usually taken to be equal to the world imports (or exports)
minus the country’s imports.
5 Chapter 5 discusses some of the limits of export market share
as an indicator of export performance.
6 In practice, this measure is proxied by a ratio of the country’s
exports to a weighted average of imports of its main
destination markets, i.e. only the geographical composition of
exports is taken into account.13
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United Kingdom (5%).7 In terms of the
evolution of market shares over time, the main
trends are broadly similar regardless of
whether they are expressed in terms of values
or volumes.8 Regarding the euro area, its
market share (in extra-euro area markets) has
remained relatively stable over time,
displaying only a small decline over the period
1992-2003 (see also Annex I, Table 3),
although its export volume share fell rapidly at
the end of the sample period due to the
appreciation of the euro that started in 2002.
The US market share instead rose over most of
the 1990s, but experienced losses at the end of
the 1990s and in the early 2000s which more
than offset the initial gains. Japan’s market
share fell rather rapidly in terms of both values
and volumes, which may be related to the
relocation of part of Japan’s production
facilities to other Asian countries. Finally, the
United Kingdom experienced a marginal
decline in its share over the whole period,
which was more pronounced during the late
1990s.
1.2.2 PRICE COMPETITIVENESS
Price competitiveness is a major determinant of
export market shares. In this report we measure
it mostly using relative export prices9, although
alternative measures are considered briefly
later in this section.
Looking first at the comparison with competitors,
price competitiveness developments were overall
7 These figures are computed on the basis of IMF and Eurostat
data. IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) provide
figures for the total exports of each country in dollar terms. In
order to take out intra-euro area exports from both world
exports and euro area exports, Eurostat External Trade
Statistics (ETS) have been used. Note that because trade data
in value terms are expressed in US dollars, developments in
market shares are mechanically influenced by changes in the
USD exchange rate (see Chapter 2 on this issue).
8 We stress that only the main trends are broadly similar as
export shares in values and volumes can differ for a variety of
reasons. For example, export shares expressed in value terms
may respond somewhat differently to movements in exchange
rates in comparison to shares expressed in volume terms.
9 In this section, relative export prices are defined as the ratio of
a weighted sum of competitor export prices to domestic export
prices (with both terms expressed in domestic currency).
Therefore, an increase in relative export prices represents a
gain in price competitiveness, which should result in a gain in
export market share according to the traditional view of trade.
Source: ECB computations based on IMF Direction of Trade Statistics and Eurostat External Trade Statistics.
Note: The chart in value terms refers to trade in goods in US dollars at current prices; world trade is defined as half the sum of total
imports plus exports net of euro area countries’ imports, and includes trade related to oil. For the United States, the United
Kingdom and Japan, the chart in volume terms is based on national accounts data (goods and services), while for the euro area it is
based on external trade statistics (goods). Foreign demand is based on ECB computations (where foreign demand is defined as a
country-specific export-weighted sum of foreign import volumes of goods and services).
Chart 1 Export market shares
(annual data)
In value terms
(as a percentage of world trade) 
In volume terms
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somewhat unfavourable for the euro area over
the 1992-2003 period (see Chart 2, left panel).
This is surprising considering that the 30%
depreciation of the euro between 1992 and
2000 could have potentially translated into a
gain in relative price competitiveness, while
conversely the most recent euro appreciation
had a negative impact (see Chart 2, right panel).
In turn, the United States experienced a large
loss in relative price competitiveness between
1995 and 2001 in line with the 20% dollar
appreciation over that period, followed by a
partial reversal of these losses as the dollar
depreciated between 2001 and 2003. As was the
case for the euro area, exchange rate
developments in Japan did not appear to be
reflected in relative export prices, as the latter
improved substantially in the period 1992-
2003 despite the significant yen appreciation
(Chart 2; right panel). Note that during part of
this period the Japanese economy experienced
deflation. Changes in relative export prices are
also affected by the product composition of
exports relative to competitors and, as we will
see in Chapter 2, Japan is relatively more
specialised in high-tech products where prices
might be falling in some sectors. Overall,
excluding Japan, price competitiveness did not
exhibit any major trends over the sample period
for the euro area and its main competitors,
although for the euro area and Japan
developments in competitiveness appeared to
be somewhat decoupled from movements in
exchange rates.
Movements in the price competitiveness of the
euro area can be more clearly understood if we
look at the various components of the relative
export price as well as alternative measures of
competitiveness (Chart 3). The left-hand panel
of Chart 3 clearly shows that the potential gains
in euro area price competitiveness resulting
from the 30% depreciation of the euro in the
period 1992-2000 were largely offset by the
rapid increase in euro area export prices, which
roughly matched the rise in competitors’ export
prices in euro terms.10
As the euro appreciated, euro area export prices
only partially followed declining competitor
Source: ECB computations based on IMF and Eurostat data.
Note: An increase in the series represents a gain in relative export price competitiveness or a depreciation of the exchange rate. The
nominal effective exchange rate of the euro refers to the official “narrow” index (12 trade partners).
Chart 2 Price competitiveness and exchange rates
(index: 1992 = 100; annual data; in euro)










































10 Although competitors’ prices in foreign currency hardly rose
over this period, they substantially increased in euro terms due
to the depreciation of the euro.15
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prices resulting in a loss in euro area price
competitiveness in the period 2001-04. Some
of the behaviour of euro area export prices over
the sample period can be explained by changes
in profit margins. As shown in Chart 3 (right
panel), while export competitiveness worsened
between 1992 and 2000 if measured by relative
export prices, it actually improved if proxied
by other indicators, such as relative unit labour
costs. Accordingly, the considerable rise in
euro area export prices in the period 1992-2000
and the associated lack of improvement in the
euro area’s relative export prices were mostly
due to increases in euro area export profit
margins rather than rising costs.11 By contrast,
the exchange rate pass-through to price
competitiveness for competitors appears to
have been relatively closer to unity.12
1.2.3 RELATIVE EXPORT PRICES AND REAL
EXPORT MARKET SHARES
In basic models of trade, changes in relative
export prices and foreign demand are the main
variables usually used to explain changes in
export volumes. This section takes a closer
look at the explanatory power of these two
variables by investigating the relationship
between relative export prices and real
export market shares. We find that, overall,
there is a strong positive relationship between
movements in these two series, while other
factors might also help to explain movements
in market share at particular points in time.
Chart 4 shows the relationship between relative
export prices and real market shares for the
period 1992-2003 for the euro area and its
major competitors. After allowing for lagged
responses, it seems that, as expected, relative
export prices correlate positively with export
market shares for the euro area and the United
States, and to a lesser extent for the United
Kingdom, although the relationship may not be
Source: ECB computations based on IMF and Eurostat data.
Note: Export prices refer to extra-euro area exports of goods. Relative export prices equal competitors’ export prices divided by
extra-euro area export prices (an increase reflects a gain in price competitiveness). NEER is the nominal effective exchange rate of
the euro with an inverted scale (i.e. an increase indicates a depreciation of the euro). Data used for relative export prices are
identical to those in Chart 2 apart from the different frequency and length of period.
Chart 3 Price competitiveness: determinants and alternative measures

























































REER (ULC in manufacturing)
REER (GDP deflator)
relative export prices
11 See Anderton, di Mauro and Moneta (2004) for a detailed
description of euro area export price determination and the
variation of export profit margins, which shows that the
exchange rate pass-through to extra-euro area export prices is
approximately 50%.
12 Spencer (1984) reports the close-to-unity exchange rate pass-
through for US export prices which is attributed to the high
degree of monopoly power of large-country exporters such as
the United States. In addition, the pass-through may be higher
for US companies as they tend to invoice their exports in
dollars.16
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stable over time. In particular, despite the
significant loss in US price competitiveness in
the period 1995-2001, the US export market
share remained remarkably stable in the period
1995-99, although it eventually declined
quite significantly from late 1999 onwards.
Similarly, the US export market share also
seemed to be somewhat unresponsive to the
substantial US gain in price competitiveness
in the period 2001-03. Likewise, the
corresponding delayed response to the loss in
euro area price competitiveness over the same
period is also puzzling. In addition, the United
Kingdom lost export market share in the period
2002-03 despite the significant gains in price
competitiveness that began in 2000. As we
shall see in subsequent chapters, some of these
puzzling developments – particularly for the
United States – may be partly related to the
product composition of world demand and
differences in the export product specialisation
of different economies.
A very interesting case in this regard is Japan,
where considerable losses in export market
share took place in spite of strong gains in
competitiveness measured by relative export
prices. Besides the fact that this relative price
indicator might be influenced by differences in
the product composition of exports, structural
factors – most notably the outsourcing of
production by Japan to other Asian countries
which are then used as export platforms for
Japanese companies – seem to be partly behind
Source: Eurostat: External Trade Statistics and national accounts; ECB.
Note: Relative export prices equal a weighted average of competitor export prices divided by domestic export prices (an increase
reflects a gain in price competitiveness). The real export market share is derived as the volume of exports divided by a weighted
average of import volumes for major trading partners. Foreign demand and competitors’ export prices are computed by the ECB.
Chart 4 Export market share (in volume terms) and price competitiveness
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the losses in export share.13 Under these
circumstances, where production processes
are undergoing substantial transformations
associated with outsourcing and the
internationalisation of production, export
market shares as indicators of export
performance are less meaningful.
1.3 THE EURO AREA AND ITS FIVE LARGEST
ECONOMIES
Although the analysis for the euro area as a
whole in the previous section was done only for
extra-euro area exports, when it comes to
individual euro area countries their export
performance is a combination of developments
in both intra and extra-euro area markets.
Therefore, this section mainly focuses on total
(i.e. intra plus extra) export behaviour,
although mention will also be made of the
behaviour of extra-euro area exports at the
country level. The country analysis provides
information about both heterogeneities in the
export performance across individual countries
as well as cross-country differences in the
ability of price competitiveness and foreign
demand to explain export performance.
1.3.1 TOTAL EXPORTS, EXTRA-EURO AREA
EXPORTS AND EMU
Chart 5 shows that for the euro area as a whole,
during the entire period, movements in extra-
euro area exports were similar to total exports
(i.e. including intra-area trade). This implies
that the growth rates of intra and extra-euro
area exports have been similar both before and
after the establishment of Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU). Overall, exports
almost doubled between the early 1990s and
2000, to broadly stabilise thereafter, due to
both the slowdown in world trade and
subsequently the appreciation of the euro.
13 Japan consistently lost export market share in the 1990s. For
example, Japan’s share of the US electronics market fell from
33% in 1990 to just 12% by 2001 (Loy, 2002). Evidence
suggests that this reflects the success of Japanese
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in setting up production
bases in Asia – to take advantage of low costs and differences
in relative factor endowments – and then using these countries
as export platforms to third markets. This hypothesis is
supported by Fung (2004) who shows that Japanese MNCs
exported 21.3% of their total sales in China and Hong Kong to
third markets and 26.5% for Asia as a whole. Lipsey (1999)
provides similar supporting evidence. Meanwhile, Bayoumi
and Lipworth (1997) provide a more general description of
changes in the structure of Japanese exports and imports.
Chart 5 Export volumes
(index: 1992=100; quarterly data; seasonally adjusted)
Source: Eurostat.
Note: Total exports refer to goods and services as recorded in national accounts statistics. Extra-euro area exports refer to goods
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By contrast, at the country level, export
performance was quite different for total exports
in comparison to extra-euro area exports (Chart
5). Interestingly, since around the time of EMU,
the disparities between total and extra-area
export growth across most of the five largest
euro area countries have increased.14 For Germany,
Italy and the Netherlands, since the late 1990s
exports to destinations outside the euro area
have grown faster than their total exports. The
opposite occurred for France. Meanwhile, the
relatively low total export growth for Italy after
the launch of the euro was mainly due to weak
export growth within the euro area, partly related
to gains in euro area market penetration by new
EU Member States. For Spain, total and extra-
euro area exports increased at similar rates since
the early 1990s and at a much stronger pace than
for the other large euro area countries, probably
due to both the trade benefits of EU membership
and the depreciation of the peseta at the
beginning of the 1990s.
1.3.2 RELATIVE EXPORT PRICE
COMPETITIVENESS OF THE EURO AREA
COUNTRIES
Overall, there has been some divergence in
price competitiveness across the five largest
euro area countries, as measured by their
14 The divergence in intra-euro area export performance at the
country level may reflect factors such as the process of
industrial concentration and restructuring, possibly further
stimulated by EMU. In this context, the existence of such
asymmetries across the individual euro area countries has to
be seen in a positive light as it strengthens the euro area as a
whole. In general, these points raise questions which are
beyond the scope of this paper, but may form the basis for
future research.
Source: Eurostat and ECB.
Note: Figures refer to total trade in goods and services. Relative export prices are a weighted average of competitor export prices
divided by domestic export prices (an increase reflects a gain in price competitiveness).
Chart 6 Determinants of price competitiveness
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respective relative export prices (see Chart 6).
The key reason for such divergence is clearly
the considerable increases in export prices for
Spain and Italy, while German and Dutch
export prices grew marginally and French
prices were virtually flat (see Chart 6). Spain
and Italy experienced a sharp improvement in
their price competitiveness in the early 1990s
due to the depreciation of the peseta and the lira
over this period which pushed up competitors’
export prices (in euro) for these two countries.
However, the improvement in competitiveness
for Italy was short-lived due to rapidly
increasing export prices. By contrast, although
increasing, Spanish export prices did not grow
as fast as their competitors’, hence the peseta
depreciation in the early 1990s provided a more
sustainable boost to Spanish competitiveness.
Since 2002, owing to the appreciation of the
euro, all of the five euro area countries
experienced a strong decline in price
competitiveness. However, by 2004, their price
competitiveness – with the exception of Italy –
was better than at the beginning of 1992.
France experienced the strongest improvement
in price competitiveness due to its export prices
remaining virtually flat over the whole period,
whereas these prices increased slightly for
Germany and the Netherlands. Overall, while
movements in relative export price
competitiveness across the largest five euro
area countries were converging in the run-up to
EMU, they diverged somewhat after EMU was
established in 1999.
1.3.3 THE ROLE OF PRICE COMPETITIVENESS
AND FOREIGN DEMAND IN EXPLAINING
EXPORT GROWTH
Since our earlier analysis showed that price
competitiveness and foreign demand appear
not to have captured entirely developments in
export growth, we now carry out a more formal
investigation into their explanatory power. Our
analysis is based on national accounts data and
export volume specifications used by the ECB
and NCBs at the country level to construct and
maintain the ECB’s Area-Wide Model (AWM)
and Multi-Country Model (MCM).15 First, we
look at the evolution of real market shares
using these data, followed by an analysis of the
export equations’ residuals in order to see how
well they explain export performance since
2000. Finally, using a “contribution analysis”
we evaluate the relative contributions of
different factors to explain export growth
(Annex I, Section 2.1).
1.3.4 REAL MARKET SHARES
Chart 7 plots the real market shares for the euro
area and the five largest euro area countries and
shows that the broad trends roughly correspond
– if one excludes some specific episodes – with
the developments in relative export prices
described above.16 Like in Chart 1, we again see
a decline in the euro area’s export volume
market share at the end of the sample period due
to the appreciation of the euro which began in
2002. Chart 7, however, is based on national
accounts data for exports of goods and services
including cross-border intra-euro area trade,
while Chart 1 is based on extra-euro area
exports of goods. The most striking outcomes
at the country level again concern Italy and
Spain. Both of these countries experienced
strong gains in market shares in the first half of
the 1990s due to the improvements in price
competitiveness resulting from exchange rate
depreciations, and in the case of Spain also due
to integration effects related to its accession to
the European Union in 1986. However, Italy
then shows a steady decline in export market
share corresponding with a deterioration in
price competitiveness, while Spain sustained
its earlier improvement in competitiveness and
continued to gain export market share until the
late 1990s. The trade-boosting impacts of
Spain’s EU membership gradually become
15 Accordingly, the export data at the country level refer to total
exports (i.e. intra plus extra-euro area exports of goods and
services).
16 In a similar fashion to the calculation for the euro area, the
market share is computed by dividing export volumes by a
weighted sum of the import volumes of selected destinations,
weighted according to their importance in the individual
country’s export markets. Details of these weights and those
used in the calculation of relative export price
competitiveness are provided in Annex I. The annual
developments in real market share for the euro area countries
are shown in percentage change terms in Annex I.20
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weaker over time resulting in a levelling-off of
Spain’s market share towards the end of the
1990s. However, relatively low levels of labour
costs and export prices in comparison to major
competitors, combined with the ongoing
process of convergence which may imply a
continued movement towards a higher ratio of
exports to GDP in line with other euro area
countries, may also help explain Spain’s ability
to maintain its higher export share in recent
years.
Meanwhile, the German and especially the
French and Dutch market shares moved more
closely together in line with analogous
movements in their price competitiveness.
Germany lost market share in the first half of
the 1990s, partly due to a loss in
competitiveness but possibly also due to
restructuring of the economy after
reunification. Thereafter, in comparison to the
other large euro area countries, Germany
gained relatively more market share in
response to the depreciation of the euro after its
launch and managed to maintain its share
despite the losses in competitiveness arising
from the euro appreciation from 2002 onwards.
This is possibly in part the result of higher trade
integration with the new EU Member States,
driven by the outsourcing of production and the
associated rise in FDI. The increase in the share
of the new EU Member States in German trade
was to some extent accompanied by a
displacement of some intra-euro area trade,
which may partly account for the decline in
export share of countries like Italy.17 Finally,
France and the Netherlands experienced fairly
stable market shares over most of the sample
period, including very weak responses to the
depreciation of the euro in the period 1999-
2000 and significant losses following the euro
appreciation from 2001 onwards.
1.3.5 MCM EXPORT EQUATIONS: RESIDUALS
In order to assess more precisely the role of
selected determinants in explaining export
performance, we look at the export equations
estimated for the largest euro area countries in
the Multi-Country Model (MCM) of the ECB.
Chart 7 Real market shares for the euro area and its five largest economies
(in volume terms; index: 1992=100; quarterly data)
Source: Eurostat (national accounts) and ECB.
Note: The chart refers to total (intra+extra-euro area) exports of goods and services based on national accounts data and ECB
computations for foreign demand. The latter is defined as a country-specific export-weighted sum of foreign (intra+extra-euro
























17 However, one should be cautious in partly attributing the loss
in Italy’s share to competition from the new EU Member States
as other euro area countries which might also have been
expected to experience export losses due to such competition
(e.g. Spain) maintained their market share.21
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Exports are modelled primarily as a function of
foreign demand and some measure of price
competitiveness. In most cases the elasticity for
foreign demand is constrained to be equal to one
in the long run, which implies that real market
shares remain stable unless there are movements
in competitiveness or other explanatory
variables (see Table 1).18 As regards the relative
price elasticity, it varies from -0.35
(Netherlands) to -0.58 (Spain, euro area).
The residuals of the export equations and the
inclusion of trend terms can give some
indication as to whether export developments
have to be attributed to factors other than foreign
demand and price competitiveness (see Chart 8).
The most striking feature of the residuals is that
they clearly show both an underestimation of
German exports since the beginning of 2002, i.e.
a better than expected performance, and an
overestimation of Italian exports since the
beginning of 2001. Overall, the residuals
suggest that factors other than price
competitiveness may also play a role in
explaining the export growth of some euro area
Source: ECB.
Note: The equations refer to total (intra+extra-euro area) export volumes of goods and services.
Table 1 Long-run parameters for the Area-Wide Model and the Multi-Country Model
Trend term Elasticity of price Constraint on
competitivness foreign demand
Euro area (Area-Wide Model) NO -0.58 YES (1)
France YES -0.54 YES (1)
Germany YES  -0.42 YES (1)
Italy NO -0.42 YES (1)
Netherlands YES -0.35 YES (1)
Spain YES -0.58 YES (1)
18 However, some of the equations also include trend terms
which can represent an underlying gain or loss in share. The
equations for Germany, France and the Netherlands include
small negative time trends, while the equation for Spain has an
elasticity for world demand of 1.2.
Source: ECB.
Note: The equations refer to total (intra+extra-euro area) export volumes of goods and services. A positive residual indicates that
actual exports are above what is predicted by the equation. For more details of the Multi-Country Model (MCM) of the ECB, see
Annex I.
Chart 8 Export volume equations: analysis of residuals
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countries. The small residual for the euro area as
a whole, which is obtained using the Area-Wide
Model of the ECB, suggests that price
competitiveness explains rather satisfactorily
movements in the euro area’s export market
share.19
1.3.6 MCM EXPORT EQUATIONS:
A CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS
In contrast to the residual analysis above, the
contribution analysis quantifies how
individual factors can explain export growth.
The contribution analysis methodology and
results are described in detail along with charts
in Annex I. The major findings are as follows.
As regards the euro area, the growth of world
demand turns out to be the most important
determinant of export growth over the sample
period 1992-2003 (see Chart 9). A key result
which confirms our earlier analysis is that over
the sample period the increase in the euro
area’s export deflator partly counterbalances
the rise in competitors’ prices due to the
protracted euro depreciation.
With respect to the euro area countries, we can
distinguish between two groups: first, countries
19 Although the results also depend on the specific measure of
competitiveness used in the individual country models.
whose exports were most affected by foreign
demand (Germany, France and the Netherlands);
and second those where competitiveness instead
plays a more prominent role (Spain and Italy).
Regarding the first group, improvements in
competitiveness – especially in the second half
of the 1990s – also had a role in explaining
export performance for Germany and France.
Turning to the second group, Italy lost all of its
competitiveness gains resulting from the
exchange rate depreciation in the early 1990s
due to rapid growth in its export deflator.
Considerable negative residuals in the early
2000s confirm that competitiveness can only
partly account for the weak Italian export
growth, indicating that factors other than price
competitiveness may also play a role. The
contribution of these negative residuals is also
relatively large in comparison with the other
factors affecting Italian export performance. As
we shall see in subsequent chapters, Italy’s intra-
euro area exports seem to have been displaced by
increasing competition from new EU Member
States, partly because the latter countries also
specialise in relatively low-tech products.
Chart 9 Contribution analysis of the euro area export equation
(percentages; quarterly data)
Source: ECB.








































CONCEPTS OF EXPORT MARKET SHARE
This box explains the different concepts of export market share used in this report as well as
differences in the data used to construct them. As already mentioned in the report, all measures
are broadly consistent in terms of overall results, although at times they may diverge
somewhat. The box is also intended to help guide readers to the specific charts in the report
where the different measures of export share are used.
Export market share indicators differ with respect to the measure of world exports used: in
particular, whether they are computed as a total indicator (i.e. the share of a country’s exports
in the total market for exports), or as an indicator that weights the geographical export markets
according to their importance in the exports of the country under analysis. Export market share
indicators differ also with respect to whether they are presented in terms of volumes or values.
More specifically, the market share in volume terms is defined in this report as an index of the
ratio of a country’s export volumes to its foreign demand, where the latter is estimated as a
weighted average of the import volumes of major trading partners, with the weights being equal
to the share of each destination in total exports. The market share in value terms, instead, is
defined as the ratio of the value of a country’s exports to an unweighted measure of the value of
world exports.
The following provides the definitions of the export shares used in the specific charts in the
report:
Chart 1 (left panel) shows export shares in value terms for exports of goods at current prices
(the numerator), with world trade (the denominator) defined as half the sum of total imports
plus exports net of euro area countries’ imports.
Chart 1 (right panel) shows an index of export market shares in volume terms using annual
data. For the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan, the share uses exports based on
national accounts data (goods and services), while for the euro area it is based on external trade
statistics (goods) for extra-euro area exports. Foreign demand (the denominator) is based on
ECB computations.
Chart 4 shows an index of export market shares in volume terms using quarterly data. The
index is the same as that shown in Chart 1 (right panel).
Chart 7 shows an index of export market shares in volume terms using quarterly data for the
euro area and the five largest euro area countries. The data refer to total (intra plus extra-euro
area) exports of goods and services based on national accounts data and ECB computations for
foreign demand. The latter is defined as a country-specific export-weighted sum of foreign
(intra plus extra-euro area) import volumes of goods and services.
Chart 10 in chapter 2 shows the version of the euro area’s export market share in value terms
which is used in the constant market share analysis in that Chapter, and compares it with the
value share shown in Chart 1 (left panel) over a longer sample period. Although these two value
shares are derived in the same way conceptually, the share used in Chapter 2 uses a different24
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data source and also excludes exports for some products and destinations. More specifically,
Chart 10 uses the World Trade Analyzer database compiled by Statistics Canada, while Chart 1
uses IMF data. In terms of the geographical breakdown, the value share used in Chapter 2
covers exports to the 14 most important destination markets for the euro area covering about
95% of its total exports (6 individual countries and 8 geographical areas). In terms of products,
the value share used in Chapter 2 excludes both exports of fuels (SITC 3) and “other goods not
elsewhere specified” (SITC 9), mostly to avoid distortions resulting from highly volatile oil
prices, etc.
1.4 CONCLUSIONS
Overall, the results show that the export market
share of the euro area (in extra-euro area
markets) has recorded only a small decline over
the period 1992-2003, in comparison to  some
of its major competitors, like the United States
and particularly Japan. However, complacency
regarding euro area exports should be avoided
as the more recent losses in euro area export
market share, combined with divergences in
export performance across the euro area
countries, suggest that euro area exports
remain vulnerable.
These export developments for the euro area
and its main competitors occurred against the
background of significant differences in the
way exchange rate movements have translated
into changes in price competitiveness and
eventually into export market shares.
Regarding the first link, the exchange rate
pass-through to price competitiveness appears
to have been relatively closer to unity for the
US and UK, as measured by relative export
prices. Less so for the euro area, where
exporters seem to absorb strong swings in the
exchange rate at least partially by increasing
export profit margins during depreciations and
reducing them during appreciations. Regarding
the role of price competitiveness and foreign
demand, it appears that these can to a
considerable extent explain export
developments at the euro area level, but this is
not always the case for individual euro area
countries. Changes in relative export prices are
more closely related to changes in market share
for the euro area than for other main
competitors, with a particularly poor
relationship between these variables for Japan.
The latter is partly due to strategic choices
regarding the localisation of production, and
the use of other Asian countries as export
platforms, which also renders export market
shares as indicators of export performance less
meaningful. Invariably, for all of the countries
considered there are some episodes where the
relationship between price competitiveness
and exports is weak, indicating that other
factors, which we broadly define as non-price
competitiveness, may also play a role and need
to be considered when assessing export
performance. This is the case, for instance, of
the delayed responses in market share to
changes in price competitiveness for the US
from the mid-1990s onwards. This broad
conclusion seems to be confirmed by the
persisting residuals resulting from estimated
export equations for some of the euro area
countries and, in particular, by a “contribution
analysis” applied to the variables and
parameters of these equations.
Among the largest euro area countries,
Germany’s and especially France’s and the
Netherlands’ export performance (in intra plus
extra-euro area markets) moved closely
together throughout the period, although
German export performance has excelled
relative to the others in recent years. Spain and
Italy, instead, were clearly different to the rest
by over- and underperforming respectively
relative to this group of countries.25
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2 A DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS OF THE
EXPORT PERFORMANCE OF THE EURO
AREA AND EURO AREA COUNTRIES20
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1 mostly dealt with the relationship
between export performance and price
competitiveness. Such an approach does not,
however, yield useful policy-related
information regarding the impact of the pattern
of specialisation in different sectors and
geographical markets on an economy’s
aggregate export market share. Accordingly,
the main aim of this chapter is to analyse –
through the so-called “constant market share
analysis” – whether euro area exporters have,
on average, out- or under-performed
competitors in selecting high-growth
destination markets and sectors.
Given the above objectives and the data
available, the empirical work is carried out on
the external exports of goods of the euro area –
in value terms – excluding volatile components
such as oil. Using these data, the aggregate
export market share of the euro area declined
from 26% to 23% during the period 1985-2001,
which is a stronger decline from the early 1990s
than that depicted in Chart 1 in Chapter 1. This
difference notwithstanding, the analysis of the
chapter is fully consistent and entirely
complementary with that conducted in the
other chapters.
The chapter begins by explaining the
methodology of the constant market share
analysis (CMSA) and the dataset. This is
followed by an overview of the major results of
the CMSA showing in a systematic way how
the product and geographical composition of
exports, as well as their competitiveness,
contributed to developments in the euro area’s
export market share. The next two sections
describe in detail the sectoral and geographical
specialisation of euro area exports along with
an analysis of how export demand in these
products and destination markets has grown
over time. Against this background, we then
shed light on how the euro area’s export
performance was shaped by the individual euro
area countries by illustrating their differences
in terms of product and destination market
specialisation, while the next section carries
out the same analysis for the euro area’s major
competitors. The chapter also investigates
some of the possible implications of the euro
area’s specialisation in medium rather than
high-tech exports, particularly the question
whether this implies some downward pressure
on its export prices (see Box 2), caused by
competition from new low-labour-cost export
competitors such as China (see Box 3).
2.2 CONSTANT MARKET SHARE ANALYSIS:
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
CONSIDERATIONS
The following analysis of the euro area export
performance uses annual merchandise exports
(to extra-euro area markets) in value terms over
the period 1985-2001. Exports are
disaggregated into 12 sectors and 14
destinations, while data related to specific
goods (like fuels and “other products not
elsewhere specified”) are excluded from the
analysis (see below). Hence there are some
important differences with Chapter 1, which
limits comparability. First, data are only
available in value terms and a subset of total
exports is used instead of total exports in
volume terms as presented in Chapter 1.
Second, the data only extend up to 2001,
thereby excluding the most recent period. As a
result, for the period 1985-2001, the euro area’s
export market share actually declined from
26.0% to 23.0%, compared with the more
marginal decline depicted in Chart 1 in
Chapter 1. Nevertheless, the broad trends are
virtually identical to those shown in the
previous chapter, while the highly
disaggregated data used in this chapter provide
rich insights into trends in sectoral and
geographical specialisation.
20 By Ildeberta Abreu, Laurent Maurin, Sonia Pokutova and
Roberto Tedeschi, with Box 3 contributed by Jian-Guang
Shen.26
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2.2.1 METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
The general idea behind the CMSA is that the
product and geographical structure of a
country’s exports can affect its total export
growth. In simple terms, if the euro area is more
(less) specialised in export products and
destination markets where demand is weak
(strong) in comparison to other products and
markets, then the euro area’s aggregate export
market share will tend to decline. The CMSA
builds on this idea by providing a breakdown of
a country’s export performance into the
separate components that are due to the product
and destination market composition of its
exports as well as other factors (such as
competitiveness).
The CMSA decomposes the actual variation in
the aggregate export market share (the total
effect) into two main parts:21
A structure effect – the hypothetical change in
the aggregate export market share which would
have occurred if the euro area share in world
markets had remained constant in each product/
destination market.
A  competitiveness effect – the difference
between the actual change in the export share
and the above-mentioned structure effect.
The structure effect is further decomposed into
three terms (see Annex II for more details):
–a   product effect, which measures whether
the relative specialisation of euro area
exports is directed towards dynamic
products in world demand;
–a   market effect, which measures whether
the export specialisation of the euro area in
terms of destination markets is directed
towards dynamic export market
destinations; and
– a residual term called the mixed structure
effect comprising the interaction effects
between the product and market structure.
2.2.2 THE DATASET
The CMSA calculations are performed using
export-of-goods data for both the euro area
(intra-euro area trade is excluded) and the
world, disaggregated to the Standard
International Trade Classification (SITC) 3-
digit level.22 The basic analysis is conducted
excluding exports of fuels and “other goods not
elsewhere specified”, mostly to avoid
distortions resulting from highly volatile oil
prices. Exports are separated into 12 broad
product groups, which are then allocated
according to their technological intensity into 3
broad categories (i.e. low, medium and high-
tech).23 In terms of geographical breakdown,
exports cover the 14 most important
destination markets for the euro area covering
about 95% of its total exports (6 individual
countries and 8 geographical areas). Chart 10
shows the euro area export market share used in
this chapter (i.e. based on 12 product groups
and 14 destinations) along with the total export
value share used in Chart 1 (left panel) in
Chapter 1. Overall, the evolution over time of
the two export shares is rather similar in the
period 1985-2001, although the export share
used in this chapter displays a somewhat
stronger decline.
One important point to note is that exports are
in USD value, hence developments in market
share are mechanically influenced by changes
in the USD exchange rate. For instance, if the
share of trade denominated in USD is smaller in
the euro area than in world exports, an
appreciation of the USD will result – ceteris
21 As mentioned in the detailed description of the CMSA
methodology in Annex II, the technique has several
drawbacks, mostly related to its empirical implementation.
Some of the choices to be made, for instance regarding the
level of product and market disaggregation or the appropriate
reference against which to judge the export performance of a
country, can have a considerable impact on the value and sign
of the various effects. Therefore, results should be interpreted
with caution.
22 See Annex II for a detailed description of the data.
23 Table 1 in Annex II provides details of the classification of
sectors into high, medium and low-tech sectors. Although the
classification is based on those used in the literature, it has
some weaknesses given the broad nature of the classification
(e.g. the technological intensity of some individual products
might be classified somewhat differently if the classification
was carried out at the 3 or 4-digit level).27
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paribus – in a decline in the euro area’s market
share.
2.3 CONSTANT MARKET SHARE ANALYSIS:
RESULTS FOR THE EURO AREA
This section starts by giving an overall
assessment of the constant market share
analysis which shows that two-thirds of the
loss in the euro area’s export market share was
due to the structure effect and one-third to the
competitiveness effect. We then break down
the structure effect into the contributions of its
two main components, namely the product and
market effects, followed by an analysis of the
individual factors that contributed to these
impacts. Finally, we identify which sectors and
geographical markets are responsible for the
negative competitiveness effect.
2.3.1 OVERALL ASSESSMENT
As mentioned above, over the period 1985-
2001, the euro area’s export market share
declined from 26% in 1985 to 23% in 2001,
with the decline mostly concentrated during the
1990s. This is equivalent to lower growth of
Sources: WTA, ECB calculations.
Note: The “Total exports” share is equivalent to that shown in Chart 1 in Chapter 1 (i.e. the non-weighted measure in value terms),
with the exception that the present chart uses WTA data, while Chart 1 uses IMF data (hence there are some minor differences).
“exports excluding fuels (SITC 3) and other goods n.e.s. (SITC9) to selected 14 destination markets” is the export share series used
in this chapter based on WTA data.






















19851 9 871 9 89 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
total exports
total exports excluding fuels (SITC 3) and other goods n.e.s. (SITC 9) to selected 14 destinations
Table 2 Main results of the constant market share analysis of euro area exports
(as a percentage of total; period averages)
Sources: WTA, ECB calculations.
1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-01 1985-2001
Share of euro area exports in world exports 26.7 25.4 23.8 22.3 24.9
Growth of euro area exports (gEA) 12.4 7.0 5.5 3.8 7.5
Growth of world exports (gW) 12.4 8.7 6.1 4.7 8.3
Total effect (TE) TE = SE + CE = gEA - gW 0.0 -1.7 -0.7 -0.9 -0.9
Structure effect (SE) SE = PE + ME + MxE 0.4 -1.9 0.1 -0.5 -0.5
product effect (PE) 0.4 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.1
market effect (ME) -0.5 -2.3 0.3 -0.7 -0.8
mixed structure effect (MxE) 0.5 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.2
Competitiveness effect (CE) -0.4 0.2 -0.7 -0.4 -0.328
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euro area exports by 0.9% per annum compared
with world export growth, which is shown in
the overview of the CMSA results as the
negative “total effect” in Table 2 (far right
column). Two-thirds of the total effect results
from a negative structure effect, while the
competitiveness effect accounts for one-third
of the decline.
The negative structure effect is due to the
market effect as the product effect had a
roughly neutral impact. The latter result
implies that the product composition of the
euro area’s exports played a broadly neutral
role in fostering export performance over most
of the years (Chart 11). By contrast, the market
effect tells us that export performance was
hampered by a relatively low weight in euro
area exports of the most rapidly growing
geographical markets. This appears to be very
relevant during most of the period, especially
in the first half of the 1990s and after the Asian
crisis in 1998.
2.3.1.1 Contribution analysis of the product
effect
Although the overall product effect was more
or less neutral, euro area exports of medium-
tech products provided a positive contribution
to the product effect, which was broadly offset
by a strong negative contribution of exports in
the high-tech sectors (Table 3). In more detail,
the positive impact from the medium-tech
sectors was partly due to the fact that the euro
area specialises in this type of export product,
combined with world demand for these exports
growing in line with the average growth of
world exports during the period 1985-2001. By
contrast, the euro area is less specialised in
high-tech sectors and was therefore unable to
Sources: WTA, ECB calculations.
Note: The decomposition of the structure effect (right panel) does not show the mixed structure effect.



































Sources: WTA, ECB calculations.
Note: The contribution is calculated as the difference in the sector’s share in euro area and world exports, multiplied by the growth of
the sector in world exports. For more details, see Annex II.
Table 3 Contribution to the product effect by technological intensity
(as a percentage of total; period averages)
1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-01 1985-2001
Low-tech -0,16 0.09 0.05 -0.04 0.00
Medium-tech 1.20 0.77 0.68 0.75 0.85
High-tech -0.74 -0.94 -0.84 -0.44 -0.79
Other products 0.09 0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.01
(index: 1985 = 100)29
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capitalise fully on the very strong growth in
world export demand for these products over
the sample period.
Looking more closely at broad export sectors, it
appears that the relative specialisation of euro
area exports in the medium-tech sectors
(chemicals and agricultural and industrial
machinery) had a high positive impact on the
product effect, given that the world exports of
these products grew at a pace close to the world
average (Chart 12). Some deterioration over
time can be observed in the case of agricultural
and industrial machinery, as this sector grew at
a relatively slower rate. Finally, although
the euro area has become relatively more
specialised in transport equipment, this was
not a high-growth sector in world export
markets. By contrast, the relatively weaker
specialisation of euro area exports in electrical
machinery and professional and scientific
products – i.e. high-tech sectors – accounts for
a significant negative contribution to the
product effect as these were the most rapidly
growing sectors in terms of world exports.
2.3.1.2 Contribution analysis of the market
effect
The main negative contribution to the market
effect for the euro area appears to arise from the
under-specialisation of euro area exports to
developed Asian countries, the US and, to a
lesser extent, Japan and China (see Chart 13).
While in the late 1980s and early 1990s the
relatively low penetration of euro area firms in
the export markets of developed Asian
countries appeared to be the dominant cause of
the negative market effect, more recently China
seems to be a key market that has been under-
exploited by euro area exporters. At the same
time, the comparatively low penetration of euro
area exports in the US was less important in
2000-01 in line with the slowdown in the
growth rate of demand in this market over the
same period.
This is partially offset by the rising
specialisation of euro area exports in the
central and eastern European countries
(CEECs) and Russia, while the role of the UK
in counterbalancing the negative market
Chart 12 Contribution of selected sectors to
the product effect
(as a percentage of total; period averages)
Sources: WTA, ECB calculations.
Note: The contribution is calculated as the difference of the
sector’s share in euro area and world exports, multiplied by
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Chart 13 Contribution of selected
destination markets to the market effect
(as a percentage of total; period averages)
Sources: WTA, ECB calculations.
Note: The contribution is the difference between the market’s
share in euro area exports and world exports, multiplied by
the growth of the market in world exports. For more details,
see Annex II.
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effects has rather sharply decreased over time
because of the slower growth of the UK market
relative to world markets (Chart 13).
2.3.1.3 Competitiveness effect
The “competitiveness” effect – which is
basically the residual of the analysis – is
somewhat volatile in the period under
consideration, but the overall impact is
negative. Although this can be interpreted as
representing a loss in export competitiveness
for the euro area – i.e. a de facto loss in market
share after taking out the structure effects – it is
not possible to completely disentangle the
influence of markets and products, hence its
interpretation must be cautious.
Still, the following analysis of the
competitiveness effect is informative and adds
value to the specialisation issues discussed
previously.
First, looking only at the product dimension,
the loss in competitiveness appeared mainly in
the low-tech sectors (Table 4, top).
Conversely, some positive contribution
(especially in 2000-01) can be observed in the
case of high-tech sectors.
Second, from the geographical market
perspective, the euro area’s gains in
competitiveness in the CEEC and Russian
markets – areas characterised by a high degree
of euro area specialisation – lasted until the
mid-1990s (Table 4, bottom). In the following
period, competitiveness made a negative
contribution to euro area exports for many
regions of the world, but we can observe some
slight improvement in euro area
competitiveness in the US and Chinese markets
over this period.
2.3.2 ANALYSIS OF THE PRODUCT EFFECT
This section provides more information on the
structure effect by looking in more detail at the
characteristics of the euro area’s exports
relevant for the product effect. This involves an
analysis of the relative product specialisation
of the euro area, as well as an identification of
the sectors which are the most dynamic in
world exports.
2.3.2.1 The structure of extra-euro area exports
by sector from a world perspective
Technologically, euro area exports are mostly
concentrated in the medium-tech sectors (most
notably chemicals, agricultural and industrial
Table 4 Contribution of sectors/markets to the competitiveness effect
(as a percentage of total; period averages)
Source: WTA, ECB calculations.
Note: The contribution is the difference between the product/market’s growth in euro area and world exports, multiplied by the share
of the product/market in euro area exports. For more details, see Annex II.
Products 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-01
Low-tech -0.095 -0.222 -0.571 -0.638
Medium-tech -0.019 -0.402 -0.180 -0.060
High-tech -0.161 -0.073 -0.083 -0.225
Other products -0.112 -0.077 -0.060 -0.042
Total -0.387 -0.176 -0.729 -0.395
Markets 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-01
China -0.027 -0.016 -0.008 -0.072
Japan -0.010 -0.043 -0.054 -0.068
UK -0.129 -0.078 -0.072 -0.018
US -0.531 -0.181 -0.030 -0.044
CEECs & Russia -0.440 -0.402 -0.170 -0.224
Developed Asia -0.136 -0.181 -0.175 -0.025
Other European countries -0.019 -0.009 -0.091 -0.012
Other destinations -0.271 -0.112 -0.387 -0.250
Total -0.387 -0.176 -0.729 -0.39531
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machinery, and transport equipment; see
Table 5). Almost half of all euro area exports
are medium-tech and their share has slightly
increased over the period. Meanwhile, high-
tech exports – such as electrical machinery and
professional and scientific products –
represented, on average over the 1985-2001
period, about 16% of euro area exports,
although their share has been increasing
steadily over time reaching 21% in 2001.
Conversely, low-tech exports rapidly
decreased in importance, dropping from almost
40% of total euro area exports in 1985 to around
30% in 2001.
When comparing euro area exports with world
exports, two major differences stand out. First,
the euro area focuses on medium-tech exports,
which accounted for around 48% of euro area
exports during the period 1985-2001, versus
39% for world exports. This share was also
rather stable through time for the euro area,
while it clearly declined for the world. Second,
the euro area has a comparatively low export
share for high-tech products, combined with a
relatively sluggish increase in the importance
of this sector (the share of high-tech exports
almost doubled to 29% by 2001 for world
exports, while it grew from 13% to only 20%
for the euro area; see Table 5).
The above results can be better visualised by
calculating an index of relative product
specialisation – defined as the difference
between the share of individual sectors in euro
area exports and its corresponding value for
world exports. According to the index, the euro
area specialises in chemicals and agricultural
and industrial machinery – i.e. medium-tech
sectors – as shown by a strongly positive value
for the index in Chart 14. Moreover, the
relative specialisation has increased also in
transport equipment, the other medium-tech
sector. One striking result is the remarkable
and increasing despecialisation of the euro area
in the two high-tech sectors – professional and
scientific equipment, and electrical machinery.
Table 5 Structure of euro area and world exports by sector
(as a percentage of total; period averages)
Sources: WTA, ECB calculations.
Note: For the description of the classification of products according to technological intensity, see Annex II.
Share of sector in euro area exports Share of sector in world exports
1985-89 2000-01 1985-2001 1985-89 2000-01 1985-2001
Low-tech 38.4 29.7 35.0 41.1 32.8 37.8
Food, beverages and tobacco (FOD) 9.7 7.5 9.1 11.8 8.1 10.4
Textile, apparel and leather (TEX) 9.1 7.3 8.5 10.4 9.5 10.3
Wood and wood products (WOD) 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.7 2.5 2.6
Paper and paper products (PAP) 2.8 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.2 2.5
Non-metallic mineral products (MNM) 4.1 3.6 3.9 3.1 2.7 2.9
Basic metal industries (BMI) 7.5 4.2 5.9 8.2 5.5 6.9
Fabricated metal products (BMA) 3.1 2.5 2.9 2.3 2.3 2.3
Medium-tech 47.6 48.9 48.2 40.4 36.6 38.7
Chemical products (CHE) 15.1 16.1 15.1 11.1 11.3 11.1
Medicines and pharmaceutical products 1.8 4.1 2.7 1.2 2.0 1.5
Manufacture of agricultural and
industrial machinery (MAI) 17.4 16.4 17.7 13.3 11.8 13.0
Manufacture of transport equipment (MTR) 15.1 16.4 15.4 16.0 13.5 14.6
High-tech 14.0 21.4 16.7 18.5 30.6 23.5
Professional and scientific equipment (MIO) 6.6 8.6 7.2 7.8 11.5 9.3
Office and data processing machinery 2.9 4.7 3.5 4.0 7.2 5.3
Manufacture of electrical machinery (MEL) 7.5 12.8 9.5 10.7 19.2 14.232
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 30
June 2005
2.3.2.2 Dynamic sectors in world exports
What is relevant however for export
performance is not the specialisation per se,
but how the latter matches world export
demand. The question is therefore: did euro
area exporters specialise in sectors which had
the most dynamic growth? To answer this
question we construct a simple indicator of
“dynamic sectors”, defined as the difference
between the growth in an export sector
worldwide and the average growth of total
world exports. A positive value indicates





























































Sources: WTA, ECB calculations.
Note: This indicator is defined as the difference between the share of the sector in euro area exports and the share of the sector in
world exports. A value higher (lower) than zero for a sector indicates that the euro area is relatively specialised (despecialised) in
the sector.
Chart 15 Dynamic sectors in world exports
(percentages; period averages)
Sources: WTA, ECB calculations.
Note: The indicator is defined as the difference between world export growth of the sector and the average growth of total world








































































export growth more dynamic than the average.
Over the period 1985-2001, the high-tech
sectors (MIO and MEL) were by far the most
dynamic sectors in world exports, with an
average annual growth rate of around 12% in
nominal terms, i.e. about 4 percentage points
higher than world trade (Chart 15). The
medium-tech sectors grew in line with total
world trade at 8% per annum over the period
1985-2001, while the growth of low-tech
exports was lower than the average (less than
7% per annum over the same period).
An important question in this regard is whether
the euro area’s specialisation in medium rather
than high-tech exports implies some downward
pressure on its export prices, caused by
competition from new low-labour-cost export
competitors (e.g. China). This issue is
examined in Box 2 below.
Box 2
EXPORT PRICES AND TERMS OF TRADE ACROSS SECTORS
This box examines the evolution of export prices and the terms of trade across sectors in order
to shed further light on the relative performance of euro area exports. In particular, the
hypothesis we want to test is whether the euro area’s specialisation in medium rather than high-
tech exports implies some downward pressure on its export prices, caused by competition from
new low-labour-cost export competitors such as China. If this is the case, while the euro area
may have experienced only a marginal loss in export market share in comparison to major
competitors, this may have been achieved by focusing on products where profitability is low
and decreasing, perhaps resulting in a deterioration in the euro area’s overall terms of trade.
Using unit values as a proxy for trade prices, the terms of trade of the euro area were fairly
stable until 1999, but then declined in line with the depreciation of the euro and subsequently
rose marginally as the euro appreciated (Chart A). Apparently, exchange rate developments –
rather than secular trends – appeared to be the trigger for changes in the overall terms of trade.
Chart A Euro area terms of trade
(index: 1992 = 100)
Source: ECB computations based on Eurostat’s External Trade Statistics.
Note: The unit values are shown separately for exports and imports of manufactures, while the terms of trade are shown for both
manufactures and total goods. The terms of trade are computed as the unit value of exports divided by the unit value of imports. A
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Chart B Euro area export prices
(index: 1992=100)
A key question regarding the specialisation of the euro area is whether its exports are more
sophisticated, or of higher quality, than the exports of newly emerging competitors such as
China. It might be the case that such competitors are involved in the export of relatively simpler
manufactures than the euro area. This could mean that they have more of a downward impact on
export prices in low-tech sectors, or that they are not directly competing against euro area
exports in the medium-tech sectors as they are in a lower quality segment of the export market
for these products in comparison to the euro area.
We can get some idea of whether this is the case by looking at euro area trade prices at the
sectoral level. Chart B shows this information for sectors where euro export prices are growing
relatively rapidly (left chart) and for sectors where prices have grown less dynamically (right
chart). Overall, there seems to be no evidence that the export prices of medium-tech sectors
have been subdued following increasing competition from low-cost competitors. In fact, the
export prices of the medium-tech sectors chemicals and transport equipment, which together
account for almost one-third of extra-area exports, grew fairly strongly from the late 1980s
onwards. Meanwhile, the high-tech sectors benefited from the strong export price growth in
electrical machinery products, but this was offset by falling export prices for professional and
scientific equipment, which includes the significant price declines associated with computer
equipment. As expected, export prices for many low-tech sectors were quite depressed (e.g. for
paper, wood products, textiles and fabricated metal products).
By looking at the terms of trade at the sectoral level, we can make an indirect comparison of the
trade prices of euro area products with those of competitors.1 Looking first at the medium-tech
sectors, the terms of trade for chemicals as well as transport equipment improved (see Chart C,
left panel). Meanwhile, the terms of trade for agricultural and industrial machinery, another
medium-tech sector, experienced a decline. Regarding the high-tech sectors, the terms of trade
for professional and scientific equipment also improved.
Source: ECB computations based on Eurostat’s External Trade Statistics.
Note: Export prices are proxied by unit values for exports. Data refer to extra-euro area exports.
1 A more direct comparison would be between export prices of the euro area and export prices of competitors to all destinations, but


































food, beverages and tobacco (FOD)
chemical products (CHE)
non-metallic mineral products (MNM)
basic metal industries (BMI)
manufacture of electrical machinery (MEL)
manufacture of transport equipment (MTR)
textile, apparel and leather (TEX)
wood and wood products (WOD)
fabricated metal products (BMA)
manufacture of agricultural and industrial machinery (MAI)
professional and  scientific equipment (MIO)
paper and paper products (PAP)
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2.3.3 MARKET EFFECT AND GEOGRAPHICAL
ANALYSIS
The overall results of the CMSA, presented in
Table 2, indicate that a weak presence of euro
area exporters in the most rapidly growing
export markets had a negative impact on the
euro area’s export performance. Following a
similar computation procedure to that adopted
for the product analysis, we now identify in
more detail which specific geographical
markets were mainly responsible for this
negative “market effect” for euro area exports.
2.3.3.1 The structure of extra-euro area exports
by destination market from a global
perspective
The main destinations of euro area exports of
goods are the European countries24 (37.0% on
average in the period 1985-2001) along with
the US (15.3%), although the share of European
destinations declined steadily to 33.2% by the
end of the sample period (Table 6). Meanwhile,
By contrast, the significant export price growth for the high-tech sector electrical machinery
was accompanied by an increase on the imports side as well, so the terms of trade were less
favourable for this sector over most of the sample period. One interpretation of the above
results is that the relatively stronger growth of the medium-tech export products of the euro
area indicates relatively higher quality products, particularly relative to low-cost producers.
However, it could also be the case that the stronger export price growth of medium-tech
products represents higher costs and a loss in competitiveness.
In summary, since the late 1980s, euro area export prices in the medium-tech sectors have
grown by at least as much as export prices in the high-tech sectors. Accordingly, there is no
evidence that the euro area’s specialisation in medium-tech products has been associated with
lower export price growth or an overall loss in the terms of trade of the euro area. On the
contrary, there is some evidence that specialisation in medium-tech products and good export
performance in those sectors has been accompanied by a move towards higher-quality
products, whose prices rose as shown by improved sectoral terms of trade.
Chart C Euro area terms of trade for product groups
(index: 1992 = 100)
Source: ECB computations based on Eurostat’s External Trade Statistics.



































food, beverages and tobacco (FOD)
textile, apparel and leather (TEX)
wood and wood products (WOD)
chemical products (CHE)
professional and scientific equipment (MIO)
manufacture of transport equipment (MTR)
paper and paper products (PAP)
non-metallic mineral products (MNM)
fabricated metal products (BMA)
manufacture of agricultural and industrial machinery 
(MAI)
manufacture of electrical machinery (MEL)
basic metal industries (BMI)
Fast-growing terms of trade Slow-growing/declining terms of trade
24 This group consists of non-euro area European countries (i.e.
the UK, Switzerland, other European countries), excluding the
CEECs and Russia.36
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exports to the CEECs and Russia increased
their share of euro area exports from 10% in
1985 to 15% in 2001. The share of euro area
exports going to Asia – most notably China –
and Latin America also increased over time.
In contrast, exports to the US accounted for the
largest share of world exports (an average of
24% between 1985 and 2001). In addition Asia,
Latin America and Canada all have higher
shares in world exports than in euro area
exports. By contrast, the world is less
specialised in the European market than the
euro area, particularly regarding exports to the
UK. These differences are obviously related to
geographical proximity.
Share of destination in Share of destination in
euro area exports world exports
1985-1989 2000-2001 1985-2001 1985-1989 2000-2001 1985-2001
Countries
Canada 1.9 1.6 1.7 5.9 5.3 5.5
China 1.6 2.6 1.9 3.2 6.1 4.3
Japan 3.4 3.6 3.9 7.3 6.8 7.4
Switzerland 8.3 6.4 7.6 3.1 2.0 2.7
UK 20.8 18.9 19.9 9.9 7.9 8.9
US 16.2 17.9 15.3 25.5 25.9 24.0
Regions
Africa 9.1 5.6 7.4 4.8 2.9 3.9
CEECs & Russia 10.0 15.2 12.2 7.4 6.4 6.4
Developed Asia 4.9 7.1 7.2 12.2 16.9 16.3
Middle East 6.2 5.1 5.7 5.1 3.6 4.4
Oceania 1.6 1.4 1.5 2.5 1.8 2.2
Other American countries 4.3 5.4 5.1 5.8 8.9 7.5
Other Asian countries 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.9 1.7 1.8
Other European countries 10.1 7.9 9.2 5.4 3.5 4.6
Table 6 Structure of euro area and world exports by destination market
(as a percentage of total, period averages)
Sources: WTA, ECB calculations.
Note: For the definitions of the destination markets, see Annex II.
Chart 16 Euro area: relative market specialisation
(percentages; period averages)
Sources: WTA, ECB calculations.
Note: This indicator is defined as the difference between the share of the destination market in euro area exports and the share of the
destination market in world exports. A value higher (lower) than zero for a destination indicates that the exports of the euro area are











































Looking at relative market specialisation
(measured as the difference between the share
of individual destination markets in euro area
exports and the corresponding share for world
exports), euro area exports appear to be
increasingly specialised towards the CEECs
and Russia and less so towards Asia, Latin
America and Canada (Chart 16).
2.3.3.2 Dynamic markets in world exports
The Asian export markets, most notably China
and developed Asia, have shown the most
dynamic growth rates in the world since the
mid-1980s (Chart 17). The import demand of
those markets grew on average by around 13%
per annum, although they exhibit a high degree
of volatility, e.g. following the Asian crisis and
the global downturn in the early 2000s. Exports
to Latin America and, to a lesser extent, Japan
also recorded faster growth than the world
average at the beginning of the period. From
the second half of the 1990s onwards, exports
to the CEECs and Russia, as well as China,
registered growth rates twice the world
average.
2.4 UNDERSTANDING THE SPECIALISATION
OF EURO AREA EXPORTS IN TERMS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL MEMBER COUNTRIES
This section attempts to provide insights into
how the CMSA results for the euro area were
shaped by the euro area countries by looking at
their individual specialisations in terms of
export sectors and market destinations.
2.4.1 CONTRIBUTION OF THE COUNTRIES TO
EURO AREA EXPORTS
The growth of euro area exports (see Table 2)
can be decomposed into the relative
contributions of the individual member
countries. As Chart 18 shows, German export
growth generally accounted for more than one-
third of euro area export growth. Meanwhile,
French and Italian extra-euro area exports grew
less than the euro area average from the mid-
1990s onwards, while Ireland increased its
contribution over time as its average annual
growth of exports (14% in the period 1985-
2001) was almost double the euro area average.
2.4.2 EXPORT SECTORS AND THE EURO AREA
COUNTRIES
As regards export product composition, most
euro area countries re-oriented their exports
Chart 17 Dynamic markets in world exports
(percentages; period averages)
Sources: WTA, ECB calculations.
Note: The indicator is defined as the difference between the export growth to a particular destination market and the average growth
of total world exports. A positive (negative) value for a destination indicates that export growth to that destination was more (less)
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away from low-tech sectors (Table 7) towards
medium-tech products (the share of the latter
sector decreased only for Finland and the
Netherlands), while many countries also
increased their shares of high-tech products.25
The euro area’s high share of medium-tech
products can be explained by the export
structure of the largest economies, as more than
half of the exports from Germany and France
belong to this group. In particular, the exports
of transport equipment rapidly increased its
share in the latter part of the sample period.
However, the high-tech share of these two
countries increased by only around five
percentage points reaching 21% in 2000-01,
remaining well below the world average (29%).
By contrast, smaller countries, such as Ireland
and Finland, are highly specialised in high-tech
exports.26
Despite a clear downward trend over time, the
role of low-tech products remains important as
seven of the euro area countries still have more
than one-third of their exports in this product
segment. For France and Spain, food and
beverages play an important role (with shares
above 10%), while exports of textiles are much
higher for Italy (export share of 18%) compared
with the euro area average.
2.4.3 EXPORT DESTINATION MARKETS AND THE
EURO AREA COUNTRIES
In terms of market destination, the exports of
the euro area countries are strongly influenced
by factors such as geographical proximity or
language (see Chart 19). Firstly, the euro area
countries trade primarily among themselves, as
Chart 18 Euro area countries’ contributions
to euro area export growth
(as a percentage of total; period averages)
Sources: WTA, ECB calculations.
Note: The contribution is the export growth of the euro area
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25 For more details, see Annex II.
26 In the case of the Netherlands, high-tech exports mainly
reflect high-tech imports. The specialisation in high-tech
exports is related to the growth of re-exports,  as the
Netherlands is an important logistical centre for ICT exports
to other European countries.
Low-tech Medium-tech High-tech
1985-1989 2000-2001 1985-1989 2000-2001 1985-1989 2000-2001
Belgium-Luxembourg 54 41 37 46 9 12
France 38 28 48 51 14 21
Germany 26 21 58 58 15 21
Greece 88 67 10 21 2 12
Ireland 49 14 22 40 30 46
Italy 47 44 42 44 12 13
Netherlands 42 31 39 34 19 35
Portugal 82 61 13 25 5 14
Spain 57 41 37 47 6 11
Austria 51 37 37 45 12 18
Finland 59 38 32 30 9 32
Euro area average 38 30 48 49 14 21
Table 7 Shares of technology sectors in euro area countries’ exports
(as a percentage of total; period averages)
Low-tech Medium-tech High-tech
1985-1989 2000-2001 1985-1989 2000-2001 1985-1989 2000-2001
Belgium-Luxembourg 54 41 37 46 9 12
France 38 28 48 51 14 21
Germany 26 21 58 58 15 21
Greece 88 67 10 21 2 12
Ireland 49 14 22 40 30 46
Italy 47 44 42 44 12 13
Netherlands 42 31 39 34 19 35
Portugal 82 61 13 25 5 14
Spain 57 41 37 47 6 11
Austria 51 37 37 45 12 18
Finland 59 38 32 30 9 32
Euro area average 38 30 48 49 14 21
Table 7 Shares of technology sectors in euro area countries’ exports
(as a percentage of total; period averages)
Source: WTA, ECB calculations.39
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intra-euro area trade accounts for half of total
euro area trade (see Table 4 in Annex II), and
with other European countries. In fact, the
share of European countries (i.e. the UK,
Switzerland and other European countries) is
above 30% for each of the five biggest
countries, although it declined over the period
1985-2001.
Secondly, the same language or culture also
encourages trade. France still maintains its old
trade linkages with several African countries,
while Spain remains the top euro area exporter
to other American countries. Partly as a result
of US foreign direct investment, the trade flows
between Ireland and the US have increased
substantially (see Box 5). Generally, the US
remains an important trade partner for
Germany, France and Italy, accounting for
around 20% of their total extra-area exports.
Thirdly, the break-up of the Soviet Union and
the run-up to EU enlargement extended the
potential export market to Eastern Europe,
which was exploited by several euro area
countries (mainly Germany, Italy, Austria and
Finland). As an example, the growth in German
exports to the CEECs is described in more
detail in Chapter 4.
2.5 MAIN COMPETITORS OF THE EURO AREA:
PRODUCT AND GEOGRAPHICAL
COMPOSITION
This section describes the differences between
the euro area and its major competitors in terms
of the product and geographical composition of
exports, thereby shedding light on the role of
competitors in shaping the export share of the
euro area.
2.5.1 PRODUCT COMPOSITION
The three most important world exporters – the
US, Japan and the euro area – have a somewhat
different product composition of exports in the
sense that, although medium-tech products
dominate (see Table 3 in Annex II), the euro
area’s share in the high-tech sector is
considerably smaller – and in low-tech
products much higher – in comparison to its
main competitors. Note that Japan has the
highest share of high-tech products.
Both the United States and Japan entered the
1990s with a relative specialisation in medium-
tech sectors (with shares of 48% and 51%,
respectively) and in the following period the
share remained stable or even decreased.
Within this group, the share of agricultural and
Chart 19 Relative market specialisation of selected euro area countries
(as a percentage of total; 1985-2001 average)
Source: WTA, ECB calculations.
Note: This indicator is defined as the difference between the share of the destination in the country’s exports and the share of the
destination in euro area exports. A value higher than zero for a country/destination indicates a relative specialisation of the country
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industrial machinery increased, but exports of
transport equipment became less important. In
the case of the euro area, we find exactly the
opposite development.
The composition of Chinese exports is
considerably different than for the other euro
area competitors, with a much higher share
accounted for by the low-tech sectors,
particularly textiles. Over time, however, there
has been a major shift towards high-tech
products in China as the share of these products
in Chinese exports rose from 5% in the late
1980s to almost 30% in 2002, with particularly
strong increases in the share for electrical
machinery.
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom has a relative
specialisation similar to that of the euro area, i.e.
in medium-tech sectors (CHE, MAI and MTR).
In contrast to the euro area, the export shares of
all of these medium-tech sectors declined over
time. In line with other competitors, this was due
to a significant change in export structure
towards high-tech sectors which seems to have
been more successful in the case of the UK than
of the euro area.
2.5.2 DESTINATION MARKETS
An analysis of exports in terms of destination
markets supports the above-mentioned
influence of factors such as geographical
proximity or language. The most important
commercial partners of the United States are
Canada (around 20% of its exports) and other
American countries, while the United Kingdom
has strong trade links with the euro area and
other European countries (see Table 4 in Annex
II). Similarly, Japan trades mainly with
developed Asian countries (around 30% of
Japanese exports), although the US also has
strong export ties with this area (14% of US
exports). In fact, the sharp downturn during the
Asian crisis had a negative impact mainly on
Japan, but Japanese exports to the region
gained a new dynamism in the late 1990s due to
trade with China. Meanwhile, the exports of the
euro area to developed Asia are relatively low.
As for China, the new major player in world
trade, in 2001 almost 22% of its exports were
directed to the US, 16% to Japan and 13% to the
euro area (for more details of China’s rising
export share in the world market and the possible
implications for euro area exports, see Box 3).
In parallel with the higher share for Japan and
China in intra-Asian trade, the euro area
increased its trade links with Eastern Europe,
albeit to a lesser extent due to the more limited
dimension of the market. Overall, it is clear that
the rapid process of globalisation has been
accompanied by substantially higher regional
integration across the world.
Box 3
CHINA’S RISING EXPORT MARKET SHARE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EURO AREA
This box investigates the recent remarkable export performance of China. China’s global export
market share rose from 1.7% in 1985 to 7.4% in 2003 (in value terms), and the share of imports
from China has increased noticeably in all major markets. It seems that the significant loss in
share by Japan was the main counterpart to the gain in global export market share by China.
Japan lost market shares in most major markets (especially in the US market), but Japan’s losses
in other Asian countries were relatively mild and it actually increased its share in China. By
contrast, the export share of the euro area does not seem to have been strongly affected by the
emergence of China as a major player in world export markets, but competition from China
might partly explain the relatively low penetration of the euro area in Asian markets. The latter
might, however, reflect the increasing regional integration in the region, largely associated with
the internationalisation of production and increased “outward processing” trade flows.41
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More specifically, China and Japan do not compete head-to-head in many product markets – with
Japan exporting largely capital-intensive products and China labour-intensive products. Hence,
the change in world export market share of these two countries may reflect the outsourcing by
Japan of labour-intensive production stages to China, even for overall capital-intensive products.
Other Asian countries have also utilised the cheap labour force of China in this way and this trend
in the regional division of labour should eventually increase the region’s competitiveness.
The share of high-tech products in China’s exports increased rapidly over the past two decades,
reaching almost 30% of Chinese exports in 2000-01 (see Chart A). This striking increase in its
high-tech product share, however, largely reflects the transfer of the final production (and
assembly) stage of these goods to China from industrialised economies (mostly Japan, Korea
and Taiwan), while the contribution of Chinese value added to this stage of production is still
estimated to be low. Subsidiaries of multinational firms accounted for nearly 90% of total
Chinese high-tech exports. Accordingly, the direct competition from China vis-à-vis the euro
area in terms of higher-value-added products appears to be fairly limited. However, low-tech
products (mainly textiles) still represent a significant share of Chinese exports and this may
pose some challenges for specific euro area countries.
Over the medium term, China is expected to climb the technology ladder rather quickly, aided
partly by the dissemination of technological know-how and management skills via FDI. The
enhanced technological capability of Chinese products can already be seen from the product
composition of the euro area’s imports from China1. More sophisticated goods, such as office
machinery, registered a significant increase in the share of the euro area’s imports over the past
four years. Traditionally more labour-intensive goods (furniture, toys, apparel and footwear)
remain China’s main export commodities to the euro area (Table A).
However, the continual FDI-induced upgrade of China’s export products, and the catching-up by
local firms, is likely to pose increasing competitive pressure on euro area firms in the future.
Chart A Structure of Chinese exports by
technological content




























1 There has been a gain in market share by Asian exporters in euro area import markets, but this is not as large as the gain in market
share of the new EU Member States.
1999 2003
Electrical machinery 6.57 14.96
Data machines 6.59 24.55




Furniture, bedding 11.79 16.98
Toys, games and sports
requisites 42.12 61.03
Misc. manufactured articles 23.75 31.60
Articles of apparel and
clothing accessories 14.17 18.25
Footwear 16.98 21.03
Source: Eurostat
Note: The table shows the percentage of euro area imports
in each sector accounted for by China.
Table A Euro area imports from China in
selected sectors
(as a percentage of the imports of the euro area by sector)42
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2.6 CONCLUSIONS
During the period 1985-2001, the aggregate
export share of the euro area in world markets
experienced a decline when measured in value
terms after excluding fuels, etc. Accordingly, a
constant market share analysis was carried out
in order to understand if this outcome might be
partly explained by the product and
geographical specialisation of euro area
exports.
The results of the CMSA suggest that the main
reason behind the declining share can be found
in the geographical structure of euro area
exports, i.e. an under-specialisation in fast-
growing markets (such as Asian markets) and a
specialisation in European markets, which are
growing relatively slowly, apart from the new
EU Member States. Somewhat contrary to
expectations, the product specialisation of euro
area exports in medium-tech sectors helped to
support the overall export performance due to
the fact that world demand in these sectors
grew in line with the average growth of world
exports, but this was almost completely offset
by the negative impact of the weak presence of
euro area exporters in the much faster growing
high-tech sectors.
We find that the US and Japan – given their
relatively higher specialisation in high-tech
products – were better placed than the euro area
to take advantage of the strong growth in world
demand for high-tech exports during most of
the period 1985-2001 (although the later
deceleration in demand for these products in
the early 2000s may partly explain their losses
in export market share towards the end of the
sample period). The under-specialisation of the
euro area in the high-tech sectors meant that the
euro area was unable to capitalise fully on the
relatively faster growth of these products in
world demand and represents a potential risk
for the future as these markets tend to be more
dynamic. However, euro area exporters
benefited from being less exposed to the
volatility of these sectors linked with the
technology boom and bust of the second half of
the 1990s and early 2000s. Nevertheless, if
world demand for high-tech products had
continued to grow as rapidly as in the mid-to-
late 1990s, the export share of the euro area
may have declined more rapidly in recent
years. Accordingly,  looking forward, the
product composition of euro area exports could
be a future source of weakness, particularly as
new world players such as China seem to be
catching-up with the euro area in terms of
product sophistication and may pose a serious
threat to market share in the coming years.
Somewhat surprisingly, the emergence of
China as a major player in world export markets
did not seem to have a strong impact on the euro
area’s export market share over the past,
although it might partly explain the relatively
low penetration of the euro area in the Asian
and US markets. Even so, the euro area was
able to capture another fast-growing market
(CEECs and Russia) and compensate to some
extent for the missed opportunities in Asia.
Although there are significant differences in
export characteristics across the euro area
countries, the largest countries – Germany and
France in particular – appear to be shaping the
pattern of euro area exports. The strong
orientation towards medium-tech products and
strong linkages with other European countries
were the main characteristics of German
exports over the last fifteen years, while new
export links have been created with the more
dynamic markets of the new EU Member
States. Meanwhile, the exports of France and
Italy grew less than the euro area average,
accompanied by relative specialisations in low
and medium-tech sectors concentrated in less
dynamic geographical markets. Although some
smaller countries – like Ireland, and more
recently, Finland – managed to change the
orientation of their exports towards high-
export-growth products (high-tech) and
markets (the United States), their impact on the
geographical and product structure of the euro
area remains limited in view of the size of these
countries.43
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In terms of market destination, the share of the
slower-growing European export markets (i.e.
the UK, Switzerland and other European
countries) is above 30% for each of the five
biggest euro area countries, although this share
declined during the period 1985-2001.
Generally, the US remains an important trade
partner for Germany, France and Italy,
accounting for around 20% of their total extra-
area exports, but this is still significantly lower
than the share of the US market in world
exports. However, partly as a result of US
foreign direct investment, the trade flows
between Ireland and the US have increased
substantially. Meanwhile, the dynamic export
markets of Eastern Europe have been mostly
penetrated by Germany, Italy, Austria and
Finland.44
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3 TECHNOLOGICAL AND STRUCTURAL
COMPETITIVENESS27
3.1 INTRODUCTION
As shown in Chapter 1, foreign demand and
price competitiveness seem to explain only part
of export behaviour for some euro area
countries. This may not be surprising as export
flows are increasingly affected by the
globalisation of production as well as rapid
technological advances, while on the demand
side consumers are becoming increasingly
more discerning with regard to quality. Against
this background, the aim of this chapter is
to discuss and evaluate how other factors,
which we broadly define as non-price
competitiveness, may help to explain export
performance. In this chapter, we focus on two
components of non-price competitiveness,
namely “technological” and “structural”
competitiveness. Following a brief overview of
the literature on the relationship between
innovation and product quality, we assess the
evolution over time of various proxies for
technological competitiveness – such as
patenting activity and R&D expenditure – for
the euro area and major competitors as well as
their possible relationship with developments
in export performance. We then look at some
structural indicators of competitiveness such
as educational attainment and survey data on
the business environment. The latter provide
measures of factors that may ultimately feed
into export performance such as labour market
regulations and tax regimes. In this context,
Chapter 4 is also partly related to non-price
competitiveness issues as it looks at how FDI
activities also affect competitiveness and
export performance.
3.2 INNOVATION, PRODUCT QUALITY AND
EXPORT PERFORMANCE
3.2.1 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
LITERATURE
In the simplest empirical model of trade, the
volume of exports is modelled as a function of
demand and relative prices. In the new trade
and endogenous growth theories expounded by
Krugman (1983, 1989) and Grossman and
Helpman (1991, 1995), the importance of
technological competitiveness in explaining
the growth of both GDP and trade flows is
highlighted. Krugman claims that high-growth
countries face higher income elasticities for
their exports, which reflect the greater variety
of goods they produce.28 Grossman and
Helpman acknowledge the role of innovation in
the development of new varieties of a
horizontally differentiated product, but they
also stress the importance of innovation in
developing new products that are of higher
quality  than similar goods available on the
market. Spending more on innovation-
enhancing activities, such as R&D, enables
firms to improve the products and thereby
move up the quality ladder relative to
competitors. Consequently, in a framework of
monopolistic competition, it is possible that a
country can shift its export demand curve
outwards by innovating which, in turn,
increases the quality of the goods it produces.
However, one important aspect to consider is
that technological improvements can lead to
either  process or product innovations: a
process innovation will result in a product
being manufactured more efficiently, thereby
reducing its costs of production, whereas a
product innovation results in a new commodity
or a higher quality product. Therefore, process
innovations will affect export volumes
indirectly via their impact on export prices and
price competitiveness rather than directly
influencing export demand.
Recently, economists have sought to include
these non-price-competitiveness factors in
empirical models of trade. At the industry
level, numerous econometric studies have
found evidence of a positive impact of
innovation – proxied by factors such as
patenting activity and R&D expenditure – on
27 By Robert Anderton, Wim Melyn, Sonia Pokutova and Javier
Torres.
28 In support of Krugman’s theory, see for example Gagnon
(2004).45
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COMPETITIVENESS trade performance (see, for example,
Fagerberg, 1988; Oliveira-Martins, 1993;
Greenhalgh et al, 1994; Magnier and Toujas-
Bernate, 1994; Ioannidis and Schreyer, 1997;
Anderton, 1999). Oliveira-Martins (1993) and
Ioannidis and Schreyer (1997) find that R&D
expenditure and patenting activity are far more
important factors in the demand curves for
trade in the medium and higher-technology-
intensity sectors than for the low-tech sectors.
In the low-tech industries, R&D expenditure
and innovation seem to be associated with
declines in export prices, thereby affecting
export demand via changes in price
competitiveness (see Greenhalgh et al, 1994).
Finally, case-study evidence suggests that the
generally good export performance of Germany
is largely based on high product quality, and
less so on price competitiveness.29 In
particular, Anderton (1998) shows that German
manufacturers of medical equipment have
continually climbed up the quality ladder (i.e.
occupying a higher quality segment of the
export market), thereby escaping competition
from the range of products offered by emerging
economies. However, as we will see in
Chapter 4, in the context of stronger
international competition the importance of
cost advantages (through lower wages) cannot
be disregarded as it seems to be an important
motivation behind Germany’s vertical FDI in
new EU Member States.
3.3 DEVELOPMENTS IN TECHNOLOGICAL
COMPETITIVENESS
As identified in Chapter 2, the specialisation of
the euro area in medium-tech sectors and its
under-specialisation in high-tech sectors have
been significant in shaping euro area exports.
In the following analysis, we focus on R&D
expenditure and patenting activity (see Box 4)
in order to proxy “technological”
competitiveness. We begin by looking at the
evolution over time of R&D intensity and
patenting activity and compare trends for the
euro area with those of major competitors. We
find some evidence that weak technological
competitiveness may have negatively
influenced euro area export performance,
particularly in the high-tech sectors. In
particular, the level of R&D intensity in total
manufacturing in Japan and the US is around
50% higher than in the euro area. Meanwhile,
within the euro area, there are significant
differences in R&D intensities across euro area
countries.
Box 4
PATENT AND R&D DATA
The patent data used in this chapter relate to patents registered in the US. The major advantage
of using such data is that they are the most comprehensive and reliable in terms of length of
sample period as well as country and product coverage (the source is the United States Patent
and Trademark Office, USPTO). Given that the patents are registered in the US, there is a bias
towards US companies (called “home advantage”), which causes an underestimation of non-
US patents. As a result, the number of patents of US companies is generally much higher than
foreign companies according to this data source and their structure is slightly different (while
the share of European companies in patents registered at the European Patent Office is
relatively higher). Nevertheless, particularly because of the importance of the US market and
the increasingly prominent role of multinationals, the US patent data still provide essential
information regarding the evolution of technological competitiveness over time, while
29 See, for example, the various National Institute of Economic
and Social Research case studies documenting the relatively
higher quality of German production (see Jarvis and Prais,
1997; Jarvis et al, 2002) and Anderton (1999), who suggests
that lower relative price elasticities for German trade relative
to the UK indicate that Germany is far less responsive to
competition based on price due to the higher quality
composition of German products.46
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3.3.1 TRENDS IN PATENTING ACTIVITY AND
R&D EXPENDITURE
Both patenting activity and R&D intensity
have grown strongly for many exporting
economies since the early 1980s, possibly
suggesting that technological competitiveness
is becoming more important over time.
Relative to competitors, however, the euro
area’s position has worsened over the same
period, particularly due to new competitors
such as the Asian economies.
As Chart 20 (left panel) shows, R&D intensity
– i.e. R&D expenditure as a proportion of value
added in the manufacturing sector – increased
rather sharply in many developed countries
over the past twenty years, more than doubling
in Japan but rising by around 60% for
the euro area. Meanwhile, in the US and the UK
the rise in R&D intensity was much less
marked. A key fact regarding technological
competitiveness is that the level of R&D
intensity in Japan and the US, at around 9% in
2000, was approximately 50% higher than the
euro area and the UK.30 Within the euro area,
allowing meaningful comparisons across countries (see also Annex III, which shows that the
general trends in the USPTO data are similar to those of the European Patent Office database).
Data used in the R&D expenditure analysis come from two different, but consistent, datasets
(the OECD STAN and ANBERD databases). Data are also available by sector, but the country
coverage is more limited in comparison to the patent data. In particular, no data are available
for most of the Asian economies and three euro area countries – namely Austria, Portugal and
Greece, which represent approximately 5% of total euro area value added – which may
marginally distort overall measures of technological competitiveness. For example,
approximating the R&D expenditure of the euro area as a weighted average of the remaining
euro area countries for which data are available creates a marginal upward bias in this measure.
For more details, see Annex III.
30 By contrast, the study by Schibany and Streicher (2005)
concludes that the differences in manufacturing R&D
intensity between the EU15 and the US are not significant.
Chart 20 Trends in technological innovation in manufacturing
(index: 1992 = 100)
Sources: USPTO, OECD STAN database.
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COMPETITIVENESS there are significant differences in R&D
intensities across euro area countries. In
particular, while Italy, Spain and Ireland31 have
low R&D intensities of around 2%, Germany
and France have levels only slightly below
those of the US and Japan (see Table 3 in Annex
III for country details). In terms of evolution
over time, the results for R&D are broadly
consistent with patent data (Chart 20, right
panel), although developments in patenting
activity are somewhat more dynamic.
In order to capture more precisely the position
of the euro area with respect to other
competitors, we constructed a simple relative
patenting indicator (see Annex III for further
details). As Chart 21 shows, the deterioration
in the euro area’s relative patenting
performance in most of the 1980s corresponded
with a rapid improvement in the performance of
Japan; later it was negatively affected by the
strong patenting activity of some other Asian
countries (for example, South Korea and
Singapore). However, from 2000 onwards the
deterioration in the euro area’s relative
patenting performance came to a halt, along
with a slowdown in US patenting activity after
the technology boom came to an end.
Although the strong performance of the Asian
economies also influenced the US and UK
relative patenting performance, these latter two
countries were more successful than the euro
area in the 1990s in maintaining their relative
position. Despite the high growth rate of
Japanese patents, Japan’s relative patenting
indicator shows a substantial deterioration
during the 1990s due to the dynamic patent
growth of the other Asian economies,
particularly as the latter account for almost
one-quarter of Japan’s major competitors.
3.3.2 THE STRUCTURE OF EURO AREA PATENTS
AND R&D BY SECTOR
A sectoral analysis of technological
competitiveness can reveal important
determinants of possible shifts in a country’s
export demand curve. It confirms that countries
which invest more in medium and high-tech
31 As we see in Box 5 (Chapter 4), multinational firms
established in the Irish economy still tend to undertake most of
their R&D activities in the home country.
Chart 21 Relative patenting performance
(index: 1992=100)
Source: USPTO.
Note: A relative patenting indicator is derived as an index of the number of patents registered by a given country divided by patents
registered by a weighted average of 12 major competitors. Weights for the euro area correspond to those used to construct the
Eurosystem National Competitiveness Indicators (see Buldorini, Makrydakis and Thimann, 2002) – Annex III also provides full
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R&D, and/or register more medium and high-
tech patents, are usually the ones specialised in
the production and export of medium and high-
tech products (see Table 3 in Annex II).
Starting with the euro area, half of all patents
registered by euro area countries in the US are
now in medium-tech sectors (see Table 8). This
share, however, is declining (from 58% in the
early 1980s), while at the same time the high-
tech share is increasing (from 31% to 39%) and
the low-tech share is falling, though slowly, to
below 10%. Data for both the US and Japan
show a much stronger move in patent activity
towards the high-tech sectors: in the 1980s a
large proportion of US and Japanese patents
were medium-tech, but now the high-tech
patents are dominant, at 56% and 67%
respectively. Despite some differences in the
evolution over time, the R&D results are
qualitatively consistent with the patent data,
confirming that the euro area has a relatively
lower high-tech share than the US and Japan.32
At the euro area country level, Germany,
France and Italy tend to shape the euro area’s
concentration in medium-tech patents. The
share of R&D in high-tech sectors in Germany
and Spain is clearly below the euro area
average. The Netherlands, Finland and Ireland
have particularly large shares in the high-tech
sectors both for patents and R&D (see Tables 1
and 2 in Annex III).
The euro area’s relative weakness in the high-
tech sectors is confirmed by looking again at its
performance vis-à-vis the US and Japan. While
R&D intensity for these competitors is high
Number of patents R&D expenditure
Euro area UK US Japan Euro area UK US Japan
1980-1984
Low 11.9 13.6 14.7 9.4 6.2 7.6 5.4 15.1
Medium 57.6 55.9 49.3 42.6 61.0 54.5 56.3 47.6
High 30.5 30.6 35.9 48.0 32.8 37.9 38.3 37.3
1985-1989
Low 12.0 12.8 14.3 8.8 6.5 6.9 5.4 14.9
Medium 55.2 49.2 45.2 37.7 58.9 60.8 58.1 44.1
High 32.8 38.0 40.5 53.4 34.6 32.3 36.5 41.0
1990-1994
Low 11.0 11.5 13.3 7.7 7.1 6.7 5.9 13.5
Medium 57.2 50.8 43.6 34.3 60.1 69.0 56.6 44.9
High 31.8 37.8 43.1 58.0 32.8 24.3 37.5 41.6
1995-1999
Low 9.9 9.4 10.5 6.3 7.4 6.2 6.1 11.5
Medium 54.3 47.8 38.4 28.1 63.2 72.8 51.6 44.1
High 35.8 42.8 51.1 65.6 29.4 21.0 42.3 44.4
2000-2002
Low 10.0 8.8 9.3 6.3 7.3 5.3 6.5 9.6
Medium 51.3 46.2 34.8 27.2 64.3 72.5 47.5 43.6
High 38.7 45.0 55.9 66.5 28.4 22.2 46.0 46.8
Sources: US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), OECD STAN database.
Note: For each economy, the number of patents (R&D expenditure) for individual sectors are expressed as a proportion of the
economy’s total patents (total R&D expenditure).
Table 8 Technological structure
(as a percentage of total; period averages)
32 However, in the last few years, euro area R&D developments
in the high-tech sectors have differed somewhat from the
evolution of patents in the same sectors, as the share of the
latter rose in the second half of the 1990s. One factor that may
partly explain this apparent contradiction is an increase in the
propensity to patent in some high-technology sectors due to
changes in the strategic behaviour of firms as well as the
increasing proliferation of computer software patents. In
addition, differences in the evolution of R&D and patents are
specially pronounced in the case of Germany, suggesting that
the high “global involvement” of German firms could help to
partly explain this difference.49
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and has been increasing, particularly for Japan,
it remains low for the euro area and has recently
fallen (see Chart 22, left panel). The
technological boom certainly improved the US
high-tech R&D intensity from the mid-1990s
onwards, but we cannot see a similar pattern for
the euro area. As a result, the differences in
R&D allocated to high-tech sectors for the euro
area relative to the US and Japan became even
more acute over this period. In fact, in the high-
tech sectors, the R&D intensity of the euro area
was around two-thirds that of the US and Japan
in 2000-2002. In the case of Japan, there was a
strong upward trend in the high-tech sectors
during the whole period, with Japan eventually
catching up with the US in the late 1990s.
Similarly, and even more strikingly, the patent
results show a decline in the euro area’s share
of high-tech patents registered by all countries
in the US (see Chart 22, right panel). While
euro area medium-tech patents accounted for
around 18% of all medium-tech patents
registered in the US in 2002, the share for high-
tech patents declined to 9%. This is
substantially lower than the Japanese high-tech
share of world patents of around 25%. The US
has managed to maintain a stable share of world
patents in high-tech products since the mid-
1980s (at a level much higher than other
countries due to the “home advantage” effect).
3.4 TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITIVENESS AND
EXPORT PERFORMANCE
Following the analysis of the previous section,
we look at the relationship between one
indicator of technological competitiveness –
R&D intensity – and the export performance of
the euro area countries and major
competitors.33 We separate the industries
according to their technological intensities as
theory tells us that the links between
technological competitiveness and exports
differ across sectors. In particular,
technological innovation is expected to play an
important role in boosting export demand
mainly in the medium and high-tech sectors.
Our earlier analysis showed that countries
which have higher shares in medium and high-
Chart 22 Technological competitiveness in the high-tech sector
(period averages)
Sources: USPTO, OECD STAN database.
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33 We only carry out the analysis for R&D intensity as it is not
appropriate to “normalise” the patent data by dividing by
value added. Also, simply using the growth rate of patents
would not be a useful alternative.50
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tech R&D and patents are the ones specialised
in the production and export of medium and
high-tech products. However, although
technological competitiveness can partly
explain the relative export shares of different
countries for specific export products, this is to
some extent an automatic result as countries
naturally tend to devote a greater amount of
R&D and patents to sectors in which they
specialise. Against this background, this
section examines the evidence of a more direct
relationship between movements in
technological competitiveness and export
performance. To do so, Chart 23 plots the
percentage change in the world export market
shares (in value terms) of the US, the UK and
the individual euro area countries against the
percentage change in R&D intensity. Data
cover the twelve broad sectors for four sub-
periods (1985-89; 1990-94; 1994-99; and
2000-02).34 The lagged value of the percentage
change in R&D intensity is used in order to
capture the probable time lag between an
increase in R&D expenditure and its possible
impact on export performance.35 As expected, a
positive relationship between changes in R&D
intensity and export performance is generally
observed for the medium and high-tech sectors
(Chart 23, upper panel), while this relationship
Chart 23 R&D intensity and export performance for selected countries
(percentage changes)
Sources: OECD STAN database, NCB calculations.
Note: Vertical axis –  percentage change in export market share in value terms; horizontal axis –  lagged percentage change in R&D
intensity. Data used in the calculation cover 10 countries (8 euro area countries, the UK and the US), 5 sub-periods (1980-84,
1985-89, 1990-94, 1994-99, 2000-01) and the 12 broad sectors grouped according to their high, medium and low-tech
classification. For more details, see Annex III.
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34 We exclude Japan from the analysis as it is clear that Japan’s
export market share has declined due to the significant impact
of the outsourcing of production to China, as well as the use of
China as an export platform by Japan. Note that the analysis is
only carried out for eight euro area countries as R&D data are
not available for all euro area countries.
35 In terms of the empirical results, the lagged variable also
performed better than the non-lagged R&D term.51
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COMPETITIVENESS does not seem to hold for the low-tech sectors
(Chart 23, lower panel).36
A regression analysis of the above variables
using panel estimation techniques, pooling the
data across the various time periods, countries
and sectors, points to similar conclusions. The
estimated parameters (and t-statistics) for the
R&D terms were as follows: low-tech sectors
0.01 (0.07); medium-tech sectors 0.09 (2.3);
high-tech sectors 0.14 (2.9). The results were
very similar regardless of whether country and
sector dummies were included. Overall, the
results relating technological competitiveness
to export performance should be interpreted
with caution as the explanatory power of the
regression equations is quite low, while the
evidence reported in Chart 23 needs to be
further investigated using more sophisticated
analysis. Another factor that is not taken into
account in the analysis is the possible
differences in the effectiveness of R&D
expenditure across countries.37
From a broader perspective, the trends in
technological competitiveness identified in
this chapter help us to interpret the results
regarding export performance in the previous
chapters. For example, Chapter 1 highlighted
how the US export market share remained
remarkably stable during the period 1995-99
despite the significant loss in US price
competitiveness over this period. These
developments seem to be linked to the
technology boom of the second half of the
1990s, which saw rapid growth in world
demand for high-tech products, accompanied
by a strong performance from the US in terms
of technological competitiveness in these
sectors. Another example is the CMSA in
Chapter 2. There we found that the product
composition had a roughly neutral impact on
the euro area’s export performance, resulting
from a positive impact from the medium-tech
sectors, offset by a negative impact from
the high-tech sectors. This result is fully
supported by the analysis in this chapter which
reveals that, in terms of technological
competitiveness, the euro area has a strong
presence in medium-tech products but is
somewhat weak in high-tech products.
Moreover, the analysis helps us to understand
the diversity of export performances across the
individual euro area countries as described in
Chapter 1. For example, the loss in the export
shares of Italy seems to partly correspond with
its weak technological competitiveness
performance across most sectors, while at the
same time technology seems to be increasingly
important in determining export performance
in world markets. However, we should be
cautious in our interpretation. For example, in
contrast to Italy, Spain managed to increase its
export share until the late 1990s and to
maintain it after that, despite its low level of
technological competitiveness (although, as
mentioned earlier, other factors seem to
explain Spain’s relatively stronger export
performance).
3.5 STRUCTURAL COMPETITIVENESS
The “structural” competitiveness of an
economy can be defined as a set of
characteristics of an economy which can
determine its export performance. These
characteristics include amongst others human
capital, infrastructure, product market
regulations, the legal and institutional
framework, and taxes. The analysis in this
section gives only a brief overview of
structural competitiveness based on human
capital and some business environment
indicators from the Institute for Management
Development (IMD) survey.38 The overall
analysis of these indicators suggests that on
both counts the euro area fares less favourably
than its main competitors. In particular,
structural rigidities seem to make the business
36 Ideally, R&D stocks are a more appropriate indicator for this
analysis but, for the sample period and country coverage, data
are only available for R&D flows. One methodology to create
data for R&D stocks is the perpetual inventory method as used
in Mayes and Soteri (1994).
37 See Pottelsberghe (1998) for an analysis of these issues.
Related issues concerning the quality of national innovation
systems are discussed in OECD (2002).
38 Measures of structural competitiveness are also compiled by
other organisations such as the World Economic Forum
(WEF).52
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environment in the euro area less conducive to
improving the performance of firms, which
may inhibit technological innovation and hurt
price competitiveness. This not withstanding,
on a positive note, some structural reforms
seem to be taking place in various euro area
countries.
However, some important caveats, which are
described in more detail below, have to be
noted regarding the use of survey data. In
addition, one should be careful in arriving at
strong conclusions regarding structural
competitiveness and its impact on export
performance based on the structural indicators
in this report as more theoretical and empirical
research is needed in this respect.
3.5.1 HUMAN CAPITAL
According to the theoretical literature, human
capital plays an important role in determining a
country’s economic growth and
competitiveness, but empirical studies have
not always found convincing evidence for
this.39 This failure is usually the result of
problems with the quality of the data and the
difficulty to quantify the interaction between
human capital and economic growth. However,
recent research by de la Fuente and Domenech
(2000) and Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001)
found a positive and significant impact of
human capital accumulation on output per
capita growth. In another study, Cohen and
Soto (2003) calculated the educational
attainment (average years of schooling of the
population aged 15-64) for a large set of
countries over the period 1960-2010 and used it
as a proxy for the human capital stock. They
were able to demonstrate the positive effects of
human capital on growth and on private and
social returns.
Using the data of Cohen and Soto, we compare
the evolution of the average years of schooling
of the euro area with that of its main
competitors and find a relatively stronger
increase for the euro area over the period 1980-
2000 (Table 9). The absolute level of schooling
however remains lower in the euro area with an
average of 11.2 years of schooling in 2000,
compared with 12.3 years for the main
competitors. This is also reflected in the
detailed figures on the share of the population
aged 15 or older with a complete higher
education. This share amounts to 22% for the
main competitors and almost 15% for the euro
area. On the basis of these figures, it seems that
the euro area still has a disadvantage regarding
the human capital stock relative to its main
competitors.
These indicators, however, give no indication
of the quality of the schooling system or the
extent to which it meets the needs of a
competitive economy. This aspect is not easy to
measure. However, one of the questions of the
IMD survey, which is referred to below, tries to
capture this aspect.
3.5.2 THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
A second indicator of structural
competitiveness relates to measures of the
business environment in which firms operate.
Many of these measures are based on survey
39 See European Commission (2002), “European
Competitiveness Report”, Chapter II.
Source: Cohen and Soto (2003).
Note: Individual country results were aggregated in order to
derive a measure for the euro area, using GDP weights for
2003, and a measure for the main competitors, using weights
based on the EER-12 index of the euro area.




of schooling 9.8 10.7 11.2
Index 1980 = 100 100 108 114
Complete higher education 8.9 11.2 14.9
(% of population
aged 15 or older)
Index 1980 = 100 100 125 166
Main competitors
Average years
of schooling 11.2 11.8 12.3
Index 1980 = 100 100 106 110
Complete higher education 15.8 20.0 22.7
(% of population
aged 15 or older)
Index 1980 = 100 100 127 14453
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COMPETITIVENESS data which have particular limitations and
should therefore be interpreted with caution.40
Different sources (IMD, WEF, EC, OECD) are
available in this respect, with a variety of
different indicators. In this report, the IMD
World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) was
chosen as it contains a broad selection of
indicators measuring the competitiveness of a
large set of countries/regions. In addition, the
focus of the IMD WCY is also highly relevant
for this report as it “analyses and ranks the
ability of nations to create and maintain an
environment that sustains the competitiveness
of enterprises”, using some 300 different
criteria. However, it should be made clear that
the results obtained by the IMD WCY can
differ from other sources, as will be shown later
in this section in a comparison with some
results of the WEF survey.
Table 10 shows four major indicators of the
business environment based on survey data
(legal and institutional framework; image of the
country; tax system; and production
infrastructure). These indicators were chosen
because they appear to be crucial in shaping the
business environment in which firms operate and
their results are available for the past ten years.41
On average, over the period 1994-2004, the
IMD surveys suggest that the business
environment was less favourable for the euro
area than for its major competitors. In
particular, the main weaknesses of the euro
area seem to be related to the legal and
institutional framework and the tax system (see
Table 10). Looking at the more detailed
individual criteria (see Table 4 in Annex III),
the euro area was assessed rather negatively
vis-à-vis major competitors with regard to
labour regulations, as well as personal taxes
and corporate taxes. Overall, the euro area only
performed better in 3 out of the 12 detailed
criteria (cross-border transactions, foreign
investors, education). Interestingly, the
education system is not viewed as a structural
weakness of the euro area.
Legal and Image of the Tax system Production Total
institutional country infrastructure
Relevance in countries framework
Belgium 3.6 7.9 2.8 6.7 5.3
Germany 3.4 7.9 3.2 6.7 5.3
Greece 3.5 7.4 4.4 4.5 4.9
Spain 4.6 7.3 4.7 5.4 5.5
France 3.4 6.9 3.4 6.1 4.9
Ireland 5.8 8.4 5.7 6.4 6.6
Italy 2.7 7.0 3.3 4.3 4.2
Luxembourg 5.3 8.1 5.5 6.6 6.4
Netherlands 5.2 8.1 4.9 6.7 6.2
Austria 4.7 8.1 5.2 7.4 6.3
Portugal 3.9 7.2 4.2 4.8 5.0
Finland 5.9 8.5 4.3 7.6 6.7
Euro area 3.7 7.5 3.7 6.0 5.2
Main competitors 5.2 7.7 5.7 6.3 6.2
Table 10 Business environment
(averages for 1994-2004)
Source: IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, various issues.
Note: The ranking is on a 1-10 scale, with 1 indicating a negative perception and 10 the most positive perception.
40 In particular: (1) the ranking of countries in the survey
depends on the criteria used and on the personal opinions of
business leaders; (2) different countries use different ways to
promote competitiveness, which is not taken into account in
business environment surveys; and (3) there is no consensus in
the theoretical literature regarding the most important factors
shaping the competitive position of a country.
41 See Annex III for a detailed description of the questions. There
were some changes in the formulation of the questions
underlying the different criteria, but the results by indicator
remained relatively stable over the whole period.54
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From the perspective of the individual euro
area countries, Finland, Ireland and
Luxembourg recorded the best overall scores,
while France, Greece and Italy registered the
worst scores, especially regarding the legal and
institutional framework and the tax system. On
average, the smaller euro area countries seem
to perform better than the larger ones.42
Apart from the indicators mentioned above,
other indicators are available in the IMD
survey but unfortunately only for the most
recent years. One of these indicators captures
whether the creation of firms in a country is
supported by legislation. Another criterion
relates to the attractiveness of investment
incentives for foreign investors. For both
criteria the score of the euro area is somewhat
below that of its main competitors.
The results for 4 out of the 12 selected
indicators of the IMD survey were compared
with the results for similar indicators in the
WEF survey43 to see whether they lead to the
same conclusions. One has, however, to be
careful in comparing the results of both surveys
as the indicators they analyse do not match
perfectly because the questions on which
they are based differ. In line with the
IMD survey, the WEF survey results for the
questions on labour regulations, the
distribution infrastructure and taxes were
better for the main competitors than for the
euro area. The result on bureaucracy, however,
was different in the WEF survey. This shows
that the results can be different depending on
the source used. One should therefore be
cautious in their interpretation.
Summarising our findings, it seems that
business environment surveys by the IMD
indicate that the euro area is in a worse position
than its main competitors and that this has been
the case since the mid-1990s. This is most
pronounced in areas like the legal and
institutional framework and the tax system.
3.6 CONCLUSIONS
Theory tells us that technological
competitiveness may improve export
performance by shifting outwards the export
demand curve, particularly in the medium and
higher-technology sectors (product
innovations), while process innovations are
likely to dominate in low-technology sectors,
thereby improving price competitiveness in
those sectors. By and large, our empirical
analysis supports this hypothesis.
Regarding our analysis of the euro area’s
technological competitiveness, both the patent
and R&D data show that most of the euro area’s
innovation occurs in medium-technology-
intensive sectors (e.g. these sectors account for
half of all patents registered by the euro area in
the US in 2002), while euro area innovation in
the high-tech sectors is substantially below that
of major competitors such as the US and Japan.
The euro area experienced a decline in its share
of world patents in high-tech sectors from the
mid-1980s to the early 2000s, while the US
managed to keep its share stable. Meanwhile,
the R&D gap between the euro area and the US
and Japan has widened recently for the high-
tech sectors. In 2000, R&D intensity in total
manufacturing in the US and Japan was about
50% higher than in the euro area, with Italy and
Spain having particularly low R&D intensities.
Our earlier analysis showed that countries
which have higher shares of medium and high-
tech R&D and patents are usually the ones
specialised in the production and export of
medium and high-tech products. However,
although technological competitiveness can
partly explain the relative export shares of
different countries for specific export products,
this is to some extent an automatic result as
countries naturally tend to devote a greater
42 We can arrange the euro area countries in the following
clusters according to whether they got a low, medium or high
score in the IMD survey: low (Italy, Greece and France);
medium (Belgium, Germany, Spain and Portugal); and high
(Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland).
43 These indicators are those that match most closely in both
surveys.55
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COMPETITIVENESS amount of R&D and patents to sectors in which
they specialise. We therefore examined the
evidence for a more direct positive relationship
between technological competitiveness and
export performance. We found that changes in
R&D intensity and export performance seem to
be positively correlated for the medium and
high-tech sectors, while this does not seem to
hold for low-tech sectors. However, this is not
a sophisticated analysis and the results should
be interpreted with caution, with further
research being needed on this issue.
From a broader perspective, the trends in
technological competitiveness identified in this
chapter help us to interpret the results regarding
export performance in the previous chapters. In
particular, developments in US export market
share seem linked to the technology boom and
bust of the second half of the 1990s. Moreover,
the analysis reinforces the message of the
constant market share calculations as both
analyses indicate that the euro area is weak in
high-tech sectors but strong in medium-tech
products. Developments in technological
competitiveness also help us to understand the
diversity of export performances across the
individual euro area countries.
Finally, our brief analysis of structural
indicators of competitiveness using educational
attainment and IMD survey data on the business
environment shows that the euro area is on
average in a less favourable position than its
main competitors. In terms of individual criteria,
the euro area compared relatively poorly
as regards labour regulations as well as
personal and corporate taxes. Overall, structural
rigidities seem to make the business
environment in the euro area less conducive to
improving firms’ competitiveness, which may
inhibit technological innovation and hurt price
competitiveness. More research is however
needed on structural competitiveness in order to
be able to firmly establish its link with export
performance and to confirm the results for the
euro area relative to its major competitors.56
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4 FDI AND TRADE44
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past 20 years world cross-border FDI
activity has grown at a rapid pace driven by the
growing role of multinationals in shaping
global economic developments. Such trends
obviously have implications for world trade
and the objective of this chapter is to shed light
on how these developments may have affected
euro area competitiveness and export
performance.
The starting point for the analysis is the large
body of academic literature on why
multinationals exist and the interactions of their
FDI activities with trade. According to the OLI
framework proposed by Dunning (1977, 1981),
three conditions are needed for a firm to engage
in FDI activities, thereby becoming
multinational.45 First, a firm must have an
Ownership advantage for a product or
production process to which other firms do not
have access (i.e. a patent, blueprint or trade
secret).46 Second, the foreign country must offer
a  Location advantage so that goods can be
produced or supplied more cheaply. Third, the
multinational firm must have an Internalisation
advantage, i.e. a strategic reason to exploit its
ownership advantage internally rather than
licensing or selling it to a foreign firm.
In order to investigate the link between FDI
activities and trade, the OLI framework has
been used to develop the so-called
“knowledge-capital” models of multinational
enterprises, which distinguish between two
broad categories of multinationals, i.e. those
carrying out “vertical” FDI and those involved
in “horizontal” FDI activities.47 Vertical firms
divide the production process along the value-
added chain across several geographical
locations, while horizontal multinationals aim
at replicating a firm’s core activities in foreign
markets to satisfy demand in the host country.
The different categories of FDI will have rather
distinct impacts on trade and competitiveness.
Horizontal FDI is likely to have a negative
impact on trade. Such a kind of FDI occurs
among countries which have similar GDP per
capita and where trade costs are relatively high
(i.e. the “tariff/trade cost-jumping argument”).
In particular, trade barriers and transport costs
cause a substitution effect away from trade and
towards foreign direct investment.48 More
recently, since trade costs have also been
falling, FDI among developed countries has
been explained by the competitive advantage of
firms in acquiring new technologies abroad.49
The technology boom in the United States and
the desire of euro area firms to acquire the new
technologies developed by US companies seem
to have been a factor behind the large euro area
FDI outflows to the United States,50
particularly in the second half of the 1990s
through M&As.
Vertical FDI instead tends to increase trade and
competitiveness, as multinational firms seek to
locate in more than one country different parts
of their production processes to maximise
efficiency and reduce costs by taking
advantage of international factor-price
differences. Generally, the production process
is carried out in the low-cost, unskilled-labour-
abundant country, while headquarter services
(such as R&D, engineering, patents,
blueprints, design and advertising) are
conducted in the high-cost, skilled-labour-
abundant country. A typical example of
vertical FDI activity is foreign outsourcing,51
which has been playing an increasing role
worldwide. These operations are characterised
by cross-border trade in intermediate goods
44 By  Tobias Blattner, Roberto De Santis, Axel Jochem and
Karin Wagner, with  Box 5 supplied by Mark Cassidy and Box
6 by Laurent Maurin.
45 OLI stands for Ownership, Location and Internalisation
advantage.
46 For example, Barrell and Pain (1997) concentrate on the role
of firm-specific assets in the form of technology.
47 For an overview, see Markusen (2002).
48 See Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Brainard (1997),
Markusen and Venables (1998), Carr, Markusen and Maskus
(2001) and De Santis and Stähler (2004).
49 See Kogut and Chang (1991), Neven and Siotis (1996), Fosfuri
and Motta (1999), De Santis, Anderton and Hijzen (2004).
50 See De Santis, Anderton and Hijzen (2004).
51 See Helpman (1984) and Freenstra and Hanson (1996).57
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within the multinational firm. The latter
repatriates most of the output for sale back
home or abroad. These activities increase intra-
firm trade and are intrinsically of a
complementary nature vis-à-vis trade. The euro
area has also exploited this form of investment
to compete on a global scale by outsourcing
important manufacturing production facilities
to the new EU Member States.
This chapter begins by providing basic
information on overall FDI activity of the euro
area, both within the area and with respect to
the rest of the world, using data compiled by the
ECB and UNCTAD. Since such data, however,
are too aggregated to provide value added in
terms of measuring the impact of FDI activities
on euro area competitiveness and export
performance and given the large restrictions in
terms of more detailed data, the chapter focuses
on a number of “case studies”. The first looks at
the importance of inward FDI in the case of
Ireland’s exports (Box 5).52 The second
analyses how M&A activity and the related
acquisition of technology may have bridged
part of the competitive gap – such as the
existing gap in research and development
previously examined in Chapter 3 – affecting
the euro area (Section 4.2.1). The third looks at
euro area vertical FDI activities in Eastern
Europe and their relative importance for euro
area countries (Section 4.2.2), particularly the
impact of outsourcing and the
internationalisation of euro area production
and how exports have become more reliant on
imported inputs, which could imply a lower
value added per export unit in comparison to
the past (Box 6). Finally, the fourth case study
relates – through an econometric analysis – FDI
activity and trade for Germany, using a detailed
regional and sectoral dataset (see Box 7). The
information collected through the case studies
supports the view that FDI activities have an
essential bearing on competitiveness and trade
developments, particularly because they
reflect substantial changes in international
production patterns.
4.2 EURO AREA FDI ACTIVITY:
AN AGGREGATE VIEW
Euro area FDI activity is rather substantial –
both within and outside the area – amounting to
around 30% of euro area GDP, which is very
similar in size to other developed countries (see
Table 11). Looking first at outward FDI
activity outside the euro area, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Finland, Ireland and Belgium are
52 For a study on FDI as an export platform to reach other
markets, see Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2003).
Extra-euro area Intra-euro area
In Out In Out
Austria 7 15 14 6
Belgium 34 22 71 74
Finland 20 29 5 13
France 12 21 14 16
Germany 9 16 16 11
Greece 4 5 8 1
Ireland 62 24 65 14
Italy 5 6 6 9
Luxembourg 2,001 1,130 540 1,294
Netherlands 157 173 57 125
Portugal 12 10 20 12
Spain 16 19 18 11
Total euro area 28 29 21 25
Memo item: World 23 23
Source: ECB, UNCTAD.
Table 11 Euro area foreign direct investment
(as a percentage of GDP; stocks at end-2003)58
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the most active euro area countries,53 while
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Ireland and
Belgium are the largest recipients of FDI
inflows in terms of their GDP. Conversely,
Greece and Italy are characterised by relatively
low levels of both inward and outward FDI.
Turning to recent intra-euro area FDI
activities, it seems that their impact on
competitiveness and trade may not be that
relevant since a substantial share of such FDI
took the form of M&As in the financial services
sector (about 83.2% of total M&As during the
period 1995-2001).54 As a result, the transfer of
technology usually associated with M&A deals
may have been rather limited with respect to
FDI between the euro area countries. With
regard to overall FDI activities within the euro
area, Belgium, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands recorded the largest FDI stock in
terms of their GDP. Note that German FDI
towards other euro area countries was a smaller
proportion of German GDP (11%) than the FDI
of other euro area countries in Germany (16%).
This probably resulted from previous
substantial investments by German companies
in euro area countries such as Spain and
Portugal in the 1980s and early 1990s being
replaced in later years by German FDI towards
the new EU Member States (see Section 4.2.2).
Meanwhile, Italy and Greece did not build up
significant FDI stocks, thereby possibly
reducing the potential positive impact on their
competitiveness and export performance.
53 The FDI outflows from Luxembourg and the Netherlands
partly reflect their role as channels for investments, directed
to and originating from outside the euro area, since a number
of foreign multinationals channel FDI  through special
purpose entities (SPEs) in these two countries. This is due,
among other reasons, to favourable financial and tax
environments in these countries. The transactions through
SPEs tend to inflate the inward and outward investments of
those countries. For example, a US investment in Germany via
a Dutch SPE appears as an outward investment from the
Netherlands to Germany.
54 In the boom period 1995-2001, intra-euro area M&A activities
accounted for approximately 60% of total extra plus intra-
euro area M&As. At the beginning of the 1990s and after the
bursting of the global “dot com” equity bubble in 2001, the
intra-euro area share amounted to around 80%.
Box 5
FDI TO THE EURO AREA: THE IRISH EXPERIENCE IN THE 1990s
The Irish economy provides a useful case study of the potential benefits for the host country of
inward FDI, as it experienced a combination of high inward FDI flows and strong export-led
economic growth during the 1990s.1
The inward FDI stock as a percentage of Irish GDP rose from 72% in 1990 to 130% in 2003, a
much higher ratio than in the European Union as a whole. This has primarily involved
“greenfield” investments and expansion of existing plants rather than M&As. The majority of
the FDI inflows into Ireland have been from US multinational firms in high-technology
manufacturing sectors, including electrical and electronic equipment, medical instruments and
higher-tech chemicals and pharmaceuticals. More recently, the economy has also managed to
attract new foreign investment in internationally traded services, including computer software
and financial services.
There is no doubt that inward FDI has improved competitiveness in Ireland, both directly
through the effect on exports and the sectoral composition of the economy and indirectly
through spillover effects on domestic firms. Real GDP growth in Ireland averaged over 7% per
annum during the 1990s with a corresponding rate of growth in real exports of over 14%. This
1 For a more complete analysis of FDI in Ireland see, for example, Barry and Bradley (1997).59
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export-led growth was driven by the foreign sector of the economy. In fact, while the share of
Irish-owned manufacturing exports in total manufacturing exports declined over the 1990s, the
foreign-owned manufacturing exports rose sharply (see Chart A).
Data on the value of exports show that foreign-owned firms in Irish manufacturing accounted
for around 95% of the total increase in Irish manufacturing exports and around 63% of the
increase in total-economy exports over the same period. Foreign firms in the services sectors
also contributed to the aggregate increase in exports, although the data are not available to
measure this contribution.
Foreign multinationals in Ireland are generally characterised by an extremely high export
orientation and productivity levels and tend to be located in high-technology sectors.2 As a
result, the Irish economy now has the highest degree of specialisation in high-technology
sectors in the European Union (ESCB, 2004). As these sectors are generally associated with
higher productivity growth rates, the increased specialisation has had a positive impact on the
competitiveness position of the Irish economy.
In addition to the direct contribution of FDI to productivity and export competitiveness, it
seems evident that the Irish economy has also benefited from spillover effects. A number of
channels for the transfer of knowledge from multinationals to the host country have been
identified in the economic literature. These include imitation effects, backward and forward
linkages, labour market channels and the effects of increased competition. In Ireland, the rate
of growth of R&D expenditures of both foreign and domestic firms since 1990, combined with
an expansion of the domestically owned information technology sector, suggest that foreign
Chart A Developments in Irish exports
Source: Irish Census of Industrial Production, national accounts.
2 In 2001, the latest year for which data are available, foreign-owned firms in the Irish manufacturing sector exported around 93%
of their output, compared with a corresponding figure of 37% for Irish-owned firms. Labour productivity levels, measured as
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4.2.1 EURO AREA HORIZONTAL FDI: M&A
ACTIVITY
Since the mid-1990s, extra-euro area M&As
formed a substantial part of total euro area FDI
abroad. They accounted on average for 62.8%
of the total euro area FDI abroad in the period
from 1999 to 2001,55 declining to 41.5% on
average over the period from January 2002 to
August 2004 (see Chart 24). They reached a
peak of EUR 361.8 billion (5.5% of GDP) in
2000.
Among the motivations for firms to merge with
or acquire an existing company, the quest for
strategic assets appears to be very relevant.
This includes acquiring R&D or technical
know-how, patents, brand names, local permits
and licences, and supplier or distribution
networks, which are not available elsewhere
in the market and take time to develop. As
they imply acquisition of knowledge
capital, M&As can therefore improve euro
area competitiveness and hence export
performance. Indeed, changes in trade patterns
also reflect structural shifts in production
caused by the use of new technologies and new
ways of organising and locating production.56
Moreover, the links between domestic and
foreign affiliates can spill over to suppliers and
other domestic firms, favouring the diffusion
of expertise and technologies. Overall,
strategic M&As are possibly carried out to
acquire both skills and technologies and may
directly or indirectly have an impact on the
competitiveness of euro area exports.
The United States is the major single
destination of extra-euro area M&A activity,
attracting on average 39% of total M&As from
the euro area over the last ten years (EUR 43.0
billion on an annual average basis; see
firms are locating more of their high-value-added processes in Ireland and also that Irish
companies are benefiting from knowledge spillovers.3
There is also empirical evidence that multinationals have had a positive effect on the
development of indigenous enterprises through the creation of linkages with domestic
producers, including a substantial increase in the proportion of raw materials used by foreign
firms which are sourced in Ireland.4 Agglomeration economies, meanwhile, have provided
momentum for the establishment of increasing numbers of knowledge-intensive
multinationals. Finally, the presence of foreign multinationals has also had a positive impact
on the value of human capital in Ireland by creating a demand for high-skilled graduates which
was not present before the 1990s and also through employee training and technological and
managerial advances.
3 Despite the increase during the 1990s, the R&D intensity of foreign firms in Ireland remains low, particularly in the high-
technology sectors, which indicates that multinational firms still tend to undertake most of their R&D activity in the home country
at headquarters.
4 See for example Görg and Strobl (2002).
55 Deal values from the Thomson One Banker database are not
strictly comparable with the balance of payments’ concept of
FDI. Data on euro area FDI outflows are usually provided on a
net basis (capital transactions’ credits less debits between
euro area investors abroad and their foreign affiliates), while
M&A activities are reported at their gross transaction values.
56 The technology boom in the United States and the desire of
euro area firms to acquire the new technologies of US
companies seem to have been a key factor behind FDI flows to
the United States, particularly in the second half of the 1990s.
In fact, De Santis et al (2004) show that US patents in high-
tech sectors and US expenditure in manufacturing R&D,
together with the investment climate in the euro area, are
statistically significant variables in explaining euro area FDI
in the United States.61
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Chart 24, left panel). Over the same time span,
the United Kingdom was the second largest
host country, accounting on average for 23% of
total euro area M&A activity abroad. However,
the share for the United Kingdom has an
upward bias given the role of the City of
London as an important financial centre for
euro area-owned monetary financial
institutions (MFIs).57 More surprisingly, other
major industrialised countries like Japan or
emerging economies in South-East Asia, and
more recently China, did not attract any
substantial part of euro area M&A activity,
despite their prominent role as hosts to global
FDI. As to the new EU Member States, during
the 1990s euro area multinationals invested in
manufacturing and in services from banking to
retailing, often through privatisations.
More recently, over the period 2002-04, the
new EU Member States were the third largest
host economy, accounting on average for
6.5% of total euro area M&A activity abroad.
The sectoral breakdown of euro area M&A
activity abroad indicates that euro area
companies invested worldwide largely in
telecommunication and business services
(which include many computer software-related
activities), medium-tech manufacturing and
finance (see Chart 24, right panel).58 The high-
tech manufacturing industries showed similar
but more subdued trends.
Overall, euro area companies are less engaged
in M&As in both low-tech industries and low-
cost countries. Investment in finance,
telecommunication and many computer
software-related business services, as well as
high-tech and medium-tech manufacturing,
represents around 80% of euro area M&As
abroad over the period 1985-2004.
4.2.2 EURO AREA VERTICAL FDI: OUTWARD FDI
IN THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
The increased internationalisation of
production over the past years has led to a
marked increase in vertical FDI, whereby
multinational firms seek to locate different
parts of their production processes in lower-
Source: Thomson One Banker.
Note: See footnote 58 in the text for a detailed breakdown of industries.











































telecom. & business services
finance
57 Investments were highly concentrated in both geographical
terms and, to a lesser extent, in terms of the number of deals.
For example, EUR 17.3 billion or 77% of euro area M&A
activity in the telecommunication sector from 1995 to 2000
were accounted for by approximately 15 transactions only in
the United Kingdom, stressing the role of the City of London
as a financial centre.
58 High-tech manufacturing includes the following industries:
aerospace and aircraft, computer and communication
equipment, medical, photo equipment and clocks and
electrical products and electrical equipment. Medium-tech
manufacturing comprises the following industries:
manufacturing of chemicals and chemical products, rubber
and plastic products, machinery and transport equipment.
Low-tech manufacturing covers the following industries: the
manufacturing of food, beverages and tobacco, metal and
metal products, textiles, apparel and leather, wood and wood
products and paper and paper products.62
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wage countries in order to maximise efficiency
and reduce costs. This type of FDI, by
enhancing the technological capabilities of an
economy and the sectoral structure of exports,
is likely to have a positive impact on
productivity and competitiveness in the host
country, as well as important effects on the
trade and competitiveness of the home country.
Most of the euro area’s vertical FDI is in the
CEECs, fuelled in the 1990s by privatisation,
economic liberalisation, deregulation and the
prospect of EU enlargement. The relatively low
wage costs (along with good education levels)
and the establishment of strategic positions in
these relatively new markets are the two main
pull factors behind euro area FDI in the CEECs.
As shown in Table 12, euro area FDI in this
region is focused on a few countries: around
70-80% of the total FDI inflows into the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia were
from the euro area (mostly from Germany, the
Netherlands and Austria).
Greenfield foreign investment in
manufacturing in the CEECs plays an
important role as 35-40% of FDI activities are
in the traditional manufacturing sectors. In
particular, the automotive industry is on a
growth path. New projects were carried out in
2003 in Slovakia (Hyundai and Peugeot-
Citroen) and Romania (Renault), coupled with
the expansion of already existing projects
(Audi and Suzuki in Hungary). In recent years,
a shift towards higher-value-added industries
and service industries (e.g. banking, insurance)
has also taken place. In some countries (e.g. the
Czech Republic), large-scale privatisation
projects particularly in the financial sector
have been the main driving force of FDI.
Bulgaria and Romania instead saw a great
number of investment projects in real estate
and the retail sector.
The increase in the CEECs’ share of euro area
trade – particularly the new EU Member States
– was to some extent accompanied by declining
intra-euro area trade, which affected mostly the
larger euro area countries. Over the period
1985-2001, there was a significant decline in
the share of the total (i.e. intra plus extra)
imports of the euro area supplied by France,
Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, while the
share of the new EU Member States increased
Czech Rep. 1) Hungary 1) Poland 1) Slovakia 2) CEEC-8 1), 2)
Austria 11.4 10.9 3.6 14.1 8.5
Belgium 4.9 2.1 3.1 1.1 . .
Denmark 0.5 0.4 2.9 0.7 2.1
France 6 5.3 13.8 7 8
Germany 22.1 32.5 18 23.3 21.5
Italy 0.8 2 4.1 8.2 2.8
Japan 1.1 1.7 0.1 0.2 0.7
Netherlands 34.1 14.8 24.6 16.8 22.3
Russia 0.1 0.2 2.9 0 1.3
Sweden 1.2 1.6 3.5 0.2 4.2
Switzerland 3.5 1.3 1.7 0.8 2.3
United Kingdom 2.7 1.1 3.2 7.3 2.8
US 4.9 8.3 10 3.9 7.4
Other countries 10.5 16.8 7.9 14.1 14
Euro area 81.7 71.4 72.2 79.5 71.2




Table 12 Inward FDI stocks in selected CEEC-economies by investing country
(as a percentage of total)63
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from just over 1% to almost 5% (Table 13).
However, the trade diversion effect is only
partially confirmed by Fidrmuc and Djablik
(2004), who claim that these developments are
also partly due to a stagnation of intra-industry
trade in the larger euro area countries since the
mid-1990s. Meanwhile, in terms of purely
extra-euro area imports, the share of the new
EU Member States had increased to 10.4% by
2003.
The biggest transformation has occurred in
trade between the new EU Member States and
Germany. As Table 13 shows, the share of the
new EU Member States in total (intra plus
extra) German imports increased from around
2% in 1985 to around 10% in 2001, with the key
trade partners being the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland. Over the same period, the
share of euro area countries in German imports
decreased from around 50% to just below 45%,
with virtually all the decline occurring from the
mid-1990s onwards. The major euro area
countries accounting for this decline are
France, Italy and the Netherlands. It is
especially pronounced in sectors such as
textiles, wood and wood products, fabricated
metals, electrical machinery and transport
equipment. To a large extent, this trade shift is
due to the rising importance of new EU
Member States’ affiliates in German firms’
production processes, which has entailed a rise
in intra-industry trade of a vertical nature.
However, some of the loss in market share by
euro area countries in Germany was also due to
increasing import penetration by Asian
economies, particularly China.
Outsourcing and the internationalisation of
euro area production suggest that exports have
become more reliant on imported inputs, which
could imply a lower value added per export unit
in comparison to the past. Therefore, although
this report focuses almost exclusively on
export performance, it is important to also
examine its relationship with import
developments since net trade is the key variable
that actually affects GDP growth. Quantitative
evidence of this phenomenon is provided by
Box 6 which shows that – in part due to
increasing outsourcing – the dependence of
exports on imports is high and rising for the
euro area. This notwithstanding, the value
added per export unit remains high while the
internationalisation of production has other
wider effects on participants, which overall are
expected to be beneficial.
Given the importance of vertical FDI in the
CEECs for German manufacturing, Table 14
compares the growth of German FDI stocks in
the eight central and eastern European EU
Member States with the growth of German
bilateral trade at the sectoral level for the
Box 6
THE IMPORT CONTENT OF EXPORTS AND THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF PRODUCTION
In addition to export performance, it is important to remember that import developments also
matter, since changes in the import intensity of exports affect the impact of export growth on
GDP. An understanding of how imports and exports interact in the euro area has critical policy
implications and is dealt with below.
Over the last ten years, the share of both exports and imports in the GDP of the euro area
countries has increased rather steadily. Although the rise in intra-industry trade may have
played a role, a major explanatory factor appears to be the rapidly increasing importance of the
internationalisation of euro area production, whereby the process of manufacturing a product is
broken down into a number of discrete parts and stages involving vertical chains of production,64
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spread over numerous countries both inside and outside the euro area. One outcome of this
process is that the import content of exports has risen over time as exports become increasingly
reliant on imported inputs, implying a lower “value added” per export unit in comparison to the
past. As a result, strong export growth is no guarantee of strong GDP growth. Chart A indicates
that euro area exports and imports tend to move closely together over the medium term.
Moreover, it shows that, on several occasions, the net trade contribution to GDP growth has
been negative even during periods of strong export growth (e.g. at the end of 1999 and start of
2000, as well as in the first half of 2004). Interestingly, it also shows that the magnitude of the
euro area’s net trade contribution has fallen over the past ten years, which again is consistent
with exports and imports moving more closely together.
In order to shed some light on this issue, we use input-output tables to directly compute the
import content of exports (we define the latter as the share of imports embodied in one unit of
exports, which can also be interpreted as the long-run elasticity of imports with respect to
exports). The import content of exports is computed for two separate years (1995 and 2000) for
Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland (Table A).
Input-output tables for the euro area do not exist, but results that roughly approximate the euro
area can be derived from the input-output tables for five countries that together account for
around 60% of euro area GDP (Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland).
Moreover, for Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland, the import content can be
broken down into its intra and extra-EU components. For all the countries, the results show an
increase in the import content of exports between 1995 and 2000, with Germany showing the
strongest increase (of 8.1 percentage points), and Italy the lowest (3.8 percentage points).1
Comparing the results across countries, the import content of exports in 2000 was highest in the
Netherlands (58.7%) and lowest in Italy (35.4%).2
1 For Germany, the results are confirmed by a recent study by DESTATIS, the Federal Statistical Office (see the press release of
17 August 2004).
2 The high import intensity of exports for the Netherlands is partly due to “transit trade”.
Chart A Euro area trade volumes
(annual growth in percentages; net trade contribution in percentage points)
Source: ECB computations based on Eurostat national accounts data.
































Moreover, weighting together the five countries as an approximation of the euro area shows
that the import content of exports for the euro area increased from 37.6% to 44.2%. In addition,
among the components of final demand, exports have by far the highest import content
(compared with 44.2% for exports in 2000, the import content of total investment was 29.0%,
while the import content of private consumption and government consumption was 19.7% and
7.8% respectively).
Given that the import content of exports increased in the euro area from 37.6% in 1995 to 44.2%
in 2000, this implies that the value added in euro area exports has declined from 62% to 56%
over the same period. However, the internationalisation of production that partly explains the
rise in the import content of exports has boosted trade as well. For the euro area, the share of
(intra plus extra) exports in GDP rose from 29% in 1995 to 38% in 2000. As a result, the net
impact of a 1% increase in exports on GDP growth may have remained constant in the euro area,
1995 2000
Total Intra-EU Extra-EU Total Intra-EU Extra-EU
Euro area 37.6 23.3 14.4 44.2 23.9 20.3
Germany 34.7 20.3 14.1 42.8 22.4 20.4
France 34 40.6
Italy 31.6 35.4
Netherlands 52.3 34.2 18.1 58.7 30.2 28.4
Austria 46.7 33.9 12.7 51 34.5 16.5
Finland 37.5 22.5 15 42 23 19.1
Source: ECB calculations using Eurostat and OECD data.
Note: 1) Computations based on Eurostat input-output tables for 1995 and 2000. 2) The euro area is approximated by a weighted
average of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland. 3) The computation for France is based on OECD input-output
tables based on a different product classification.
Table A  Import content of exports for the euro area and euro area countries
(percentages)
Source: ECB calculations using Eurostat and OECD data.
1) Computations based on Eurostat input-output tables for 1995 and 2000.
2) The euro area is approximated by a weighted average of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland.
Chart B Import content of exports across major manufacturing sectors for the euro area
import content (1995)
import content (2000)
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period 1997-2002. It is important to emphasise
that FDI and trade activities in the traditional
sectors, such as food, textiles and wood, are not
as dynamic as in other sectors characterised by
higher value added. The sectors where the shift
away from intra-euro area imports to imports
from new EU Member States has been most
pronounced are characterised by strong
dynamics in German FDI and a reversal in the
bilateral trade balance from a surplus to a
deficit. Transport equipment exhibits the
highest value of German FDI. In the high-tech
sector professional and scientific goods, the
level of FDI is lower, but also increased
substantially over time and simultaneously
entailed a jump in German imports.59 All in all,
firms specialised in manufacturing electrical
machinery, scientific and optical goods, and
transport equipment have shifted some
production abroad in order to import
intermediate manufacturing goods, implying
that German firms have benefited from
increasing efficiency by a restructuring of
production and outsourcing abroad (see Box 7).
4.3 CONCLUSIONS
Trade patterns have been changing
significantly, partly reflecting structural shifts
in production caused by new technologies, new
demand patterns, new trade policies and new
ways of organising and locating production. In
particular, the share of parts and components in
total trade and intra-firm trade has been rising.
Therefore, the activities carried out by
multinational enterprises have become
important in understanding competitiveness,
trade dynamics and export performance. A
genuine improvement in international
competitiveness can result from FDI via the
upgrading of human resources or the use of
with the decline in the value added of exports being counterbalanced by the increasing share of
exports in GDP.
Looking at the geographical breakdown of imports for the intra-EU15 and extra-EU15, it
appears that, although the intra-EU import content generally increased from 1995 to 2000, it
increased much less than the extra-EU import content. In the case of the Netherlands, it has
even decreased. The greater increase in the extra-EU import content may be partly related to
the rapid increase in outsourcing between the euro area and the new EU Member States.
Meanwhile, Chart B shows that the import content of exports for the euro area as a whole varies
widely across sectors, with exports of office machinery and computers showing the highest
import intensity and fabricated metal products the lowest. Moreover, there was an increase in
the import content of exports in all of the sectors shown between 1995 and 2000, with increases
ranging from 3.9 to 12.1 percentage points.
To conclude, the evidence suggests that the extent to which exports depend on imports is high
and increasing for the euro area. Nevertheless, the value added per export unit remains high. On
a sectoral basis, it would appear that the high-tech sector “office machinery and computers”
recorded the highest import intensity and therefore a lower net trade contribution to GDP than
some medium-tech sectors. This bodes well for the euro area (at least for now) given the
specialisation of euro area exports in medium-tech products.
59 A recent survey of the German Chamber of Commerce also
indicates that German FDI in the new Member States is
primarily motivated by cost advantages arising from lower
wages. According to this study, especially small and medium-
sized firms in electrical engineering, the textile industry and
the chemical sector are going to play an increasing role. In the
first years of transition, German FDI in central and eastern
Europe was dominated by large enterprises (DIHK, 2004).67
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1985 2001 Difference 2001-1985
Germany Euro area Germany Euro area Germany Euro area
Germany 18.1 14.7 -3.3
France 12.0 9.9 9.3 8.7 -2.7 -1.3
Italy 10.7 7.6 8.1 6.8 -2.6 -0.8
Belgium-Luxembourg 7.3 6.8 7.5 7.3 0.1 0.5
Greece 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 -0.5 -0.2
Ireland 0.9 0.8 2.3 1.9 1.5 1.1
Netherlands 10.5 7.4 7.3 5.8 -3.2 -1.5
Portugal 0.7 0.6 1.1 1.0 0.4 0.4
Spain 2.0 2.3 3.2 4.4 1.2 2.1
Austria 4.1 2.0 4.4 2.0 0.3 0.1
Finland 1.0 0.7 1.3 0.9 0.3 0.2
Euro area countries 49.9 56.7 44.7 53.8 -5.1 -2.9
Denmark 2.1 1.3 2.1 1.2 -0.1 -0.1
United Kingdom 7.7 8.1 7.0 8.1 -0.7 0.0
Sweden 2.8 2.6 1.7 1.8 -1.1 -0.8
EU 15 countries 62.5 68.7 55.4 64.9 -7.0 -3.8
Czech Republic - - 3.1 1.3 - -
Slovakia - - 0.9 0.4 - -
Hungary 0.5 0.3 2.5 1.3 2.0 0.9
Poland 0.6 0.4 2.8 1.3 2.1 0.9
New EU Member States 1.8 1.1 10.1 4.9 8.3 3.8
Switzerland 4.4 3.0 4.3 2.7 -0.1 -0.3
United States 8.0 8.1 7.7 7.1 -0.3 -1.0
Japan 5.7 3.9 4.1 3.2 -1.6 -0.7
China 0.6 0.4 2.8 2.4 2.3 2.0
Source: World Trade Analyzer.
Note: Imports by country/region of origin are expressed as a percentage of total (intra+extra) imports. Data for some new EU
Member States are not available for 1985.
Table 13 Euro area imports: the increasing role of new EU Member States
(as a percentage of German and euro area imports by country of origin)
FDI stock Exports Imports
2002 2002/1997 2002 2002/1997 2002 2002/1997
(% growth) (% growth) (% growth)
Low-tech
Food, beverages and tobacco (FOD) 393 45.6 1,581 34.9 1,527 50.6
Textiles, apparel and leather (TEX) 267 44.3 3,381 10.0 3,381 -14.2
Wood and wood products (WOD) 65 66.7 435 74.7 1,285 7.0
Paper and paper products (PAP) 248 56.0 1,945 72.7 1,284 196.5
Non-metallic mineral products (MNM) 998 209.9 1,036 81.8 1,001 19.2
Basic metal industries (BMI) 90 143.2 2,367 81.4 2,616 40.3
Fabricated metal products (BMA) 404 160.6 2,793 92.4 2,703 80.7
Medium-tech
Chemical products (CHE) 1,394 212.6 8,926 71.5 3,978 72.0
Manufacture of agricultural/indust.
machinery (MAI) 802 51.3 7,509 49.8 5,239 136.4
Manufacture of transport
equipment (MTR) 3,723 129.5 9,022 124.9 12,301 234.9
High-tech
Professional and scientific
equipment (MIO) 106 265.5 2,552 55.7 3,134 337.1
Manufacture of electrical
machinery (MEL) 870 49.0 6,615 89.7 7,180 140.5
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, German Federal Statistical Office.
Note: Data refer to manufacturing FDI.
Table 14 Structure of German FDI and trade in the CEEC-8
(EUR millions, unless otherwise specified)68
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 30
June 2005
Box 7
GERMANY: THE IMPACT OF FDI ON TRADE FLOWS
This box investigates the impact of the outward and inward FDI stock on trade and
competitiveness in Germany employing a cross-section gravity model with 21 sectors and 34
countries, 18 “developed” and 16 “transition” economies.1 Sectors have been pooled in two
groups: low and medium-tech (15 industries) and high-tech (6 industries).
We test whether outward and inward FDI stocks affect German imports and exports vis-à-vis
developed and transition economies, controlling for a set of standard variables used widely in
the literature. The causal direction from FDI stocks to trade in the current period is justified by
the fact that existing FDI stocks have been cumulated over the past. The results for the year
2002 are reported in Table A.2
Among the explanatory variables, distance and GDP are generally significant and have the
expected sign (ie, GDP has a positive sign as the larger a country’s GDP, the greater the amount
of trade that will take place; distance has a negative sign as the greater the distance between
countries, the smaller the amount of trade that will take place). The EU dummy relates to the
EU acceding countries (including or excluding Bulgaria and Romania) was not significant.
Meanwhile, German FDI to the transition economies has a significant positive impact on
1 The developed countries are the euro area countries (excluding Greece and Portugal), Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The “transition economies” are the ten new EU Member States, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.
2 FDI stocks of the reforming countries in Germany are negligible and were therefore excluded.
Transition economies Developed economies
low-med tech high-tech low-med tech high-tech
exports imports exports imports exports imports exports imports
GDP 0.338 0.22 0.447 0.279 0.269 0.318 0.547 0.711
[3.45]** [1.74] [3.57]** [2.62]* [3.57]** [3.50]** [5.08]** [4.06]**
Distance -0.392 -1.036 -0.259 -1.572 -0.372 -0.401 -0.541 -0.377
[1.65] [3.46]** [1.07] [4.61]** [3.84]** [2.93]** [4.07]** [2.10]*
FDI (out): low-med tech 0.213 0.285 0.307 0.232
[2.02]* [3.89]** [8.14]** [4.35]**
FDI (inward): low-med tech 0.139 0.236
[3.89]** [4.42]**
FDI (out): high-tech 0.372 0.667 0.337 0.153
[6.21]** [7.80]** [5.97]** [1.98]
FDI (inward): high-tech -0.009 0.163
[0.16] [2.29]*
EU dummy 0.295 0.406 0.466 0.565
[1.72] [1.65] [2.01]* [1.64]
Constant 3.583 8.57 1.387 10.4 2.464 0.611 1.762 -3.334
[1.97] [3.28]** [0.95] [3.68]** [2.58]* [0.55] [1.64] [1.88]
Observ. 106 106 42 42 151 151 60 60
R2 – adj. 0.32 0.31 0.68 0.77 0.58 0.47 0.67 0.53
F-test 13.25 18.24 31.49 73.98 50.43 43.32 27.3 19.4
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table A  Impact of German inward and outward manufacturing FDI on bilateral trade
(year 2002)
Note: Robust t-statistics in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.69
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improved technologies, which is what we have
called “horizontal” FDI. In addition, FDI can
also be used to gain export market share by
utilising resources in labour-intensive and low-
labour-cost countries, i.e. “vertical” FDI.
Euro area FDI activities with developed
economies outside the euro area were largely in
the form of M&As. In particular, investment in
finance, telecommunication and business
services (including computer software-related
services), and high-tech and medium-tech
manufacturing represents around 80% of extra-
euro area outward M&As over the last twenty
years. The desire of euro area firms to absorb
and acquire new technologies available
worldwide, and particularly in the United
States, is a possible explanation for these
developments. Therefore, strategic M&As
might have provided the required missing
elements for greater technological
competitiveness of euro area exports, although
the evidence is mixed regarding the direct
German exports as well as imports for the low, medium and high-tech sectors. In particular, the
t-statistics and the estimated parameters indicate that trade in the high-tech sectors is strongly
linked with German outward FDI stocks. Moreover, the elasticity of German imports is higher
than the elasticity of German exports in both low-medium and high-tech sectors, with the
highest value displayed for high-tech imports. This is in accordance with Table 14, where it is
clearly indicated that firms specialising in manufacturing electrical machinery, professional
and scientific equipment or transport equipment have shifted production abroad in order to
import intermediate manufacturing goods (i.e. vertical FDI).
With regard to the impact of outward and inward FDI stocks on German trade vis-à-vis other
advanced economies, the results suggest that the German outward FDI stock has a larger
positive impact on German exports than on imports, while FDI activity in Germany tends to
promote German imports rather than its exports. In particular, there is no evidence of a
statistically significant relationship between outward FDI stocks and German imports as well
as between the inward FDI stock and German exports in the high-tech sectors. This supports the
hypothesis that the relocation of production processes to reduce costs does not play a major role
for FDI in and from advanced economies in the high-tech sectors (i.e. horizontal FDI).
Data sources: Deutsche Bundesbank for FDI micro database, German Federal Statistical
Office for the external trade statistics, the Newcronos database of Eurostat and a web-based
distance calculator.
Estimation method: Cross-section OLS for the year 2002. Variances are estimated by the
Huber-White sandwich procedure and are robust against heteroscedasticity.
impact of this type of FDI on trade. Hence,
further research is required on this issue before
reaching firm conclusions.
The international intra-firm division of labour
is also intensifying. In this context, evidence
was presented on the high and increasing
activity of euro area multinationals in new EU
Member States. Econometric analysis for
Germany tends to support the expectation that
this type of FDI (“vertical”, i.e. aimed at
exploiting low labour costs through the
internationalisation of production) has a
positive impact on both exports and imports.
The overall outcome seems to be that exports
have become more reliant on imported inputs,
which could imply a lower value added per
export unit in comparison to the past.
Quantitative evidence of this phenomenon
shows that – in part due to increasing
outsourcing – the dependence of exports on
imports is high and rising for the euro area.
This notwithstanding, the value added per70
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export unit remains high while the
internationalisation of production has other
wider effects on participants, which overall are
expected to be beneficial.
The counterpart to the higher share of new EU
Member States in euro area trade was the
decline in intra-euro area trade among some of
the larger euro area countries. In particular,
German firms specialising in manufacturing
electrical machinery, scientific and optical
goods and transport equipment have shifted
some production to the new EU Member States
and now import intermediate manufacturing
goods from these countries, implying that
German firms have benefited from increasing
efficiency by restructuring and outsourcing
abroad, at a cost, however, of crowding out
some euro area producers.
Besides horizontal or vertical activities, FDI is
also sometimes used as an export platform to
reach other markets. The experience of inward
FDI in Ireland is very informative as affiliates’
output produced in Ireland is largely sold in
third markets. Multinational firms provide
Ireland with competitive assets for export-
oriented production of technology-intensive
and dynamic products in world trade. Skills
development and knowledge transfer also
provide spillovers for domestic firms.
Therefore, the export competitiveness of
Ireland improved. By contrast, Italy stands out
as a large euro area country which has
relatively small inward and outward stocks/
flows of FDI, and has therefore benefited very
little from the potentially large improvements
in price and non-price competitiveness
resulting from FDI.71
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5 AN ASSESSMENT OF EURO AREA EXPORT
PERFORMANCE60
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this final chapter is to take a look at
the main findings of the report and to critically
evaluate their importance and implications.
From a policy perspective, the links between
export performance and monetary policy may
at first seem somewhat indirect. However,
despite being large and relatively closed in
comparison to the individual euro area
economies, the economy of the euro area
remains strongly influenced by external trade
developments. Accordingly, the findings of
this report provide policy-makers with a
detailed review and explanation of the euro
area’s export performance, thereby improving
our understanding of past, and perhaps future,
developments in euro area economic activity.
In particular, against the background of rapid
changes in the structure of both euro area
exports and world trade, various aspects of
export developments need to be closely
monitored within the economic analysis
underlying the ECB’s assessment of price
stability over the medium term. In this context,
the findings of the report provide policy-
makers with critical inputs regarding: (i) issues
related to the product and geographical
specialisation of euro area exports; (ii)
divergences in export performance across the
euro area countries due to differences in price
as well as technological and structural
competitiveness; and (iii) changes in the
relationships between exports, imports and
domestic activity resulting from outsourcing
and the internationalisation of production.
One important aspect identified in this report is
that euro area exporters utilise their profit
margins in order to mitigate the impact of
exchange rate shocks on price competitiveness
which, in turn, reduces the impact on export
volumes. Moreover, our findings regarding the
product and geographical specialisation of
euro area exports are also highly relevant for
the understanding of export developments,
possibly providing useful background
information for trade projections. In particular,
the product composition of world demand
growth – and particularly how it compares with
the medium-tech product specialisation of euro
area exports – has an impact on export growth,
thereby shedding light on why the relationship
between changes in exchange rates and export
volumes sometimes differ from their usual
pattern. The medium-tech specialisation of
euro area exports is also consistent with
measures of technological competitiveness –
proxied by patenting activity and R&D
expenditure – as most of the euro area’s
innovation is concentrated in the medium-
technology-intensive sectors, while euro area
innovation in the high-tech sectors is
substantially below that of major competitors
such as the US and Japan. However, regarding
the role of price competitiveness and foreign
demand over the whole sample period, it
appears that these can largely explain export
developments at the euro area level, but this is
not always the case for individual euro area
countries.
Although specialisation in medium-tech
sectors resulted in a satisfactory outcome, as
world demand for these products grew at the
same pace as total world exports, the under-
specialisation of the euro area in the faster-
growing high-tech export sectors represents a
missed opportunity. In addition, if the world
demand for high-tech products had continued
to grow as rapidly as in the mid-to-late 1990s,
the export share of the euro area may have
declined more rapidly in recent years.
Accordingly, looking forward, the product
composition of euro area exports could be a
future source of weakness, particularly as new
world players such as China seem to be
catching-up with the euro area in terms of
product sophistication and are likely to pose
increasing competitive pressure on euro area
firms in the future. In this context, given the
rapidly changing product composition of world
exports, the report suggests the need for
60 By Robert Anderton, Filippo di Mauro and Roberto Tedeschi.72
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structural reforms which would enhance
innovation and create the flexibility necessary
for the euro area to move rapidly towards
sectors which are expanding in terms of both
exports and innovation in the future. This may
also help to reduce the significant differences
in export performance across the euro area
countries. Finally, although this report focuses
almost exclusively on export performance, we
also examined its relationship with import
developments since net trade is the key variable
that actually affects GDP growth. We found
that FDI and globalisation, particularly the
growing relevance of the internationalisation
of production, tend to raise the import content
of exports as the latter have become
increasingly more reliant on imported
intermediate inputs, although the value added
per export unit remains high. As a result, this
has affected the relationships between exports,
imports and domestic activity, thereby
highlighting one aspect of the changing
economic environment in which monetary
policy operates.
5.2 EXPORT MARKET SHARES AND PRICE
COMPETITIVENESS
Chapter 1 showed that since the early 1990s the
euro area experienced a smaller fall in its
export market share in comparison to the more
marked declines experienced by major
competitors such as the United States and
particularly Japan. The relative resilience of
euro area exports over this particular sample
period should not be a cause for complacency,
particularly as more recently the euro area has
experienced losses in export market share due
to the euro appreciation which started in 2002
combined with divergences in export
performance across the euro area countries. In
particular, the recent strong export growth of
Germany has been offset by a rather weak
export performance by some of the other euro
area countries. Furthermore, the smaller
decline in the euro area’s export share in
comparison to major competitors should be
seen against the background of a number of
issues and caveats.
First, a loss of export market shares by
developed economies as emerging economies
are catching up is to be expected as it
constitutes an adjustment to a new equilibrium.
In this context, the United States and Japan are
relatively more exposed than the euro area to
export competition from the Asian economies.61
This partly explains the somewhat weaker
export market shares of the United States and
Japan given the strong export performance of
the other Asian countries. In particular, as
explained in Chapter 2, the emergence of China
as a major player in world export markets has
had a significant negative impact on Japan’s
export share, while the euro area does not seem
to have been especially affected.
Second, the euro area’s relatively stable export
market share over part of the sample period was
achieved against the background of a loss in the
terms of trade connected to the depreciation of
the effective exchange rate of the euro until
2000. The loss in terms of trade may reduce
growth in the other components of GDP by, for
example, lowering real incomes and consumer
expenditure. However, despite the loss in the
overall terms of trade, the products in which the
euro area specialises – i.e. medium-tech
products – actually experienced increases in
the terms of trade.
Third, the 30% depreciation of the effective
exchange rate of the euro from the early 1990s
to 2001 was associated with only limited
changes in price competitiveness as strong
growth in euro area export prices offset a
significant part of the beneficial impacts of the
depreciation on the price competitiveness of
the euro area. However, looking at the
dynamics of unit labour costs, the rise in euro
area export prices appears not to be connected
to rising costs, but rather to increases in
exporters’ profit margins, confirming that euro
area exporters are able to mitigate the impact of
exchange rate shocks on price competitiveness
61 This can be seen from the higher export weights – when
including third-market effects – attributed to the Asian
economies for the US and Japan in comparison to the euro area
(see Annex III).73
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and export volumes by varying their profit
margins, raising them during times of
depreciation and lowering them when
appreciations occur.
It should also be noted that, when looking at the
major euro area countries, Spain and Italy
recorded rapid export price growth, while
export prices of other large euro area countries
grew only marginally. Meanwhile, the
changing nature of the product structure of
Italy and Spain’s exports might also suggest
that compositional changes resulting from
improvements in quality may partly explain the
rising export prices in these two countries. This
would also be consistent with the
improvements in the terms of trade for specific
euro area sectors mentioned earlier, but this is
not analysed in detail in this report and remains
an issue for possible future research.
On the negative side, Italy experienced a
substantial decline in export market share from
the second half of the 1990s onwards, partly due
to the poor price competitiveness resulting from
rapid increases in export prices. Italy’s exports
also suffered from fierce and direct competition
from both the new EU Member States and Asia,
combined with weak technological
competitiveness. But this was not the case for
Spain, which managed to substantially increase
its export market share – despite rapidly rising
export prices – partly thanks to the protracted
trade benefits of its accession to the European
Union in 1986. In addition, relatively low levels
of labour costs and export prices in comparison
to major competitors, combined with the
ongoing process of convergence – which may
imply a continued movement towards a higher
ratio of exports to GDP in line with other euro
area countries – may also help to explain Spain’s
ability to maintain its higher export share in
recent years. While the export performances of
Spain and Italy were clearly different, Germany,
France and the Netherlands were somewhat
similar to each other partly as a result of similar
movements in price competitiveness. The major
difference among these countries was that
Germany, after an initial poor export
performance in the post-reunification period,
increased its world export market share.
Meanwhile, France and the Netherlands
experienced fairly stable market shares over
most of the sample period, showing weak
responses to the gains in competitiveness due to
the depreciation of the euro during the period
1999-2000, followed by some losses in market
share due to the euro appreciation from 2002
onwards. The sometimes weak response of
market shares to price competitiveness, and
particularly the very good export performance of
Germany, call for alternative explanations.
Among those, the report gives a special
importance to the impact that the
internationalisation of production – particularly
strong for Germany – has on export
performance.
Fourth, and connected with the point above, a
simple analysis of market shares is not
sufficient to capture the complex interactions
between the changing production patterns and
trade. In particular, the report underlines how
for Japan and Germany the outsourcing of
labour-intensive stages of production to
neighbouring regions – South-East Asia and
the new EU Member States respectively –
yielded quite different outcomes: trade
diversion for Japan and trade creation for
Germany. The different outcomes are possibly
related to the relative maturity of the
outsourcing process. South-East Asia is clearly
an export platform to the rest of the world for
Japanese companies. In this context, Japan may
be losing market share, but its companies have
reduced costs through outsourcing, while
amassing considerable wealth in terms of
reinvested profits in ongoing FDI operations
abroad. In addition, the considerable advances
in technological competitiveness by Japan
imply that outsourcing to South-East Asia has
allowed Japan to devote more domestic
resources to the higher-value-added stages of
production – including the creation and
application of new technologies – where it has
a comparative advantage. On the other hand,
the outsourcing process for the euro area, most
notably German outsourcing to the new EU74
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Member States, may be at an earlier stage in
comparison to Asia. This is a fact which may
represent a potential source of weakness for
euro area trade going forward, as larger shares
of manufacturing production may eventually
be transferred abroad and directly exported
from those locations, the more so if structural
reforms do not take place, in particular the need
for more liberalisation to facilitate movements
of workers (in particular unskilled workers)
between sectors, namely into services.
5.3 MARKETS, SECTORS AND TECHNOLOGICAL
AND STRUCTURAL COMPETITIVENESS
The constant market share analysis in Chapter 2
shows that some of the loss in the euro area’s
market share was due to an under-
specialisation in rapidly growing markets such
as Asia. However, as described in Box 3 in
Chapter 2, this does not necessarily imply an
inability of euro area exporters to penetrate
such markets, but rather that much of the trade
in Asia has been intra-regional and associated
with outsourcing to China. Accordingly, much
of this Asian trade is based on geographical
proximity and under these circumstances there
may be some barriers to the euro area
significantly increasing its export share in this
region. However, given the growth potential of
the Chinese market, this is clearly a drawback
for the euro area. Finally, although the euro
area’s export performance was held back
somewhat by its high exposure to some slow-
growing European markets, its growing
specialisation in the more dynamic markets of
the new EU Member States made a significant
positive contribution to the euro area’s export
performance. Even so, the potential size of this
market is not comparable to the Asian one.
Although the constant market share analysis
showed that product specialisation did not have
a strong bearing on the overall export share of
the euro area, this was the outcome of an under-
specialisation in high-tech sectors – where
export demand grew rapidly particularly
between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s –
which was offset by a high degree of
specialisation in medium-tech products. These
results are consistent with those of Chapter 3
which show that, in terms of technological
competitiveness as proxied by patenting activity
and R&D expenditure, most of the euro area’s
innovation is concentrated in the medium-
technology-intensive sectors, while innovation
of the euro area in the high-tech sectors is
substantially below that of major competitors
such as the United States and Japan. These
trends in technological competitiveness and
specialisation, particularly the strong
differences between the euro area and major
competitors in terms of medium and high-tech
specialisation, help to explain export
performance. In particular, developments in US
export market share seem to be strongly linked
to the technology boom and bust of the second
half of the 1990s and of the early 2000s. Finally,
although the euro area has a relatively smaller
presence in high-tech export markets than its
major competitors, the constant market share
analysis shows that in high-tech sectors where
the euro area has a presence, its export
performance was actually quite good. However,
caveats regarding the classification of sectors
into high, medium and low-technology-
intensity categories should be mentioned: first,
the allocation of sectors according to
technological intensity in this report is only a
rough approximation and is somewhat less
sophisticated than classifications based on 3 or
4-digit-level data; and second, specific products
might have a technological content which is
somewhat different from what the classification
suggests.62
Apart from its impact on market share, what are
the other possible consequences of the euro
area’s specialisation in medium-tech sectors?
One possibility is that, relative to high-tech
sectors, the export prices of medium-tech
products are more exposed to downward
62 For example, although in this report Germany is generally
defined as specialising in the export of medium-tech
products, more detailed information sometimes suggests
otherwise. Case studies comparing ostensibly the same
products across countries find that German products usually
embody a relatively higher degree of quality (Jarvis and Prais,
1997; Anderton and Schultz, 1998; Jarvis et al, 2002).75
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pressure from new low-labour-cost export
competitors such as China. However, Box 2 in
Chapter 2 addresses this question and finds
little evidence that the euro area’s
specialisation in medium-tech products has
been associated with downward pressure on
export prices.
However, the more fundamental question for the
longer term is not whether the sectors in which
the euro area currently specialises are doing
well, but rather the extent to which the euro area
can move rapidly and flexibly towards
expanding sectors in terms of both exports and
innovation in the future. Although there are
several important caveats to bear in mind and
other indicators may give a somewhat different
picture, our analysis of structural
competitiveness – using educational attainment
and survey data – shows that national business
environments are overall less favourable for the
competitiveness of the euro area when compared
with its main competitors. In terms of individual
criteria, the euro area compared relatively
poorly in terms of labour regulations as well as
personal and corporate taxes. Overall, structural
rigidities seem to make the business
environment in the euro area less conducive to
improving firms’ competitiveness, which may
inhibit technological innovation and hurt price
competitiveness. One has, however, to be
careful in arriving at far-reaching conclusions in
this respect as these results are partly based on
survey data and more research is needed on
structural competitiveness and its link with
export performance.
5.4 FDI, COMPETITIVENESS AND THE
INTERNATIONALISATION OF PRODUCTION
As described in Chapter 4, one motive behind
euro area outward FDI in developed economies
(horizontal FDI) seems to have been the
acquisition of technology via M&A activity.
During the last decade, a significant proportion
of euro area M&A activity took place in the
high-tech sectors such as telecommunications
and business services (including ICT
companies), mostly located in the United
States. For example, the technology boom in
the United States and the desire of euro area
firms to acquire the new technologies of US
companies seem to have been one factor behind
the large euro area FDI outflows to the United
States, particularly in the second half of the
1990s through M&As. Therefore, strategic
M&As might have provided the required
missing elements for greater technological
competitiveness of euro area exports, although
the evidence is mixed regarding the direct
impact of this type of FDI on trade. Hence,
further research is required on this issue before
reaching firm conclusions.
Meanwhile, the increased internationalisation
of production over the past years has also led to
a marked increase in vertical FDI, whereby
multinational firms seek to locate different
parts of their production processes in different
countries – particularly emerging markets – in
order to maximise efficiency and reduce costs.
This type of FDI, by enhancing the
technological capabilities of an economy and
the sectoral structure of exports, is likely to
generate high productivity in the host country,
while having important spillovers on euro area
trade. Most of the euro area’s vertical FDI is
being carried out by German, Dutch and
Austrian firms and is largely directed towards
the new EU Member States. The resulting rise
in trade with the new EU Member States, the
share of which has tripled over the past decade,
was associated with a decline in intra-euro area
trade shares, particularly regarding German
imports from France, Italy and the Netherlands.
Finally, this report focuses almost exclusively
on export performance, but it is important to
also examine its relationship with import
developments since net trade is the key variable
that actually affects GDP growth. Quantitative
evidence of this phenomenon is provided by
Box 6 in Chapter 4, which shows that – in part
due to increasing outsourcing – the dependence
of exports on imports is high and rising for the
euro area. This notwithstanding, the value
added per export unit remains high, while the
internationalisation of production has other76
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wider effects which overall are expected to be
beneficial. For example, particularly for
Germany, outsourcing to the new EU Member
States reduces costs and increases profitability
which, in turn, should have a separate positive
influence on GDP.77
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO CHAPTER 1
1 EURO AREA EXPORTS: ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION
Table 1 Euro area foreign demand
(percentage shares by destination country)
Germany France Italy Spain Netherlands Euro area
Euro area 44 50.3 47.4 61.1 64.8
Extra-Euro area 56 49.7 52.6 38.9 35.2
of which:
Denmark 3.2 1.8 1.5 1.8 4.5 2.6
Sweden 4.3 2.8 1.9 2.3 6.3 3.9
United Kingdom 14.5 18.9 12.5 21.1 27.3 17.6
Switzerland 8.9 7.4 6.8 2.8 4.5 6.9
Japan 4.5 3.6 4.2 3.1 2.8 3.9
United States 14.3 12.3 14.3 11.1 10.5 12.6
Norway 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.3 2.3 1.4
Canada 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.3 0.9 1.2
Former economies in transition 16.8 6.4 14.3 12.9 9.9 12.9
Latin America 4.6 6.2 7.4 15.4 4.0 5.4
Non-Japan Asia 14.1 14.3 14.1 10.0 12.5 13.0
Other countries 12.1 23.7 20.2 22.1 14.8 18.6
Source: ECB, IMF.
Note: Average export weights over the period 1995-97.
Germany France Italy Spain Netherlands
Euro area 38.9 42.7 42.8 47.3 46.4
Extra-euro area 61.1 57.3 57.2 52.7 53.6
of which:
Denmark 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.5
Sweden 2.8 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.6
United Kingdom 7.8 7.0 6.7 7.0 7.4
Switzerland 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.9 3.2
Japan 8.4 8.0 8.3 6.2 6.4
United States 13.2 12.5 12.8 12.5 10.4
Norway 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8
Canada 3.0 2.5 2.8 2.0 1.8
Former economies in transition 4.6 5.2 4.5 4.6 5.9
Latin America 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.1 3.0
Non-Japan Asia 11.5 10.4 10.8 9.7 9.6
Table 2 Competitor export prices
(percentage shares by country)
Source: ECB, IMF.
Note: Average export weights over the period 1995-97.82
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2 STANDARD DETERMINANTS OF EXPORTS
ACCORDING TO NCB AND ECB MODELS
2.1 A CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS USING THE
MULTI-COUNTRY MODEL (MCM)
We carried out a contribution analysis using the
export volume specifications estimated by the
ECB and NCBs in the context of the Multi-
Country Model (MCM) and the Area-Wide
Model (AWM). The MCM provides export
volume equations for the five largest euro area
countries which have been estimated in a
consistent fashion using similar specifications
for each of the countries. All of the equations
restrict the foreign demand parameter to be
equal to unity and include a relative export
price term. In some cases trend terms prove to
be significant. Meanwhile, the AWM provides
export volume equation parameters for the
aggregate euro area. In both the MCM and
AWM, export volumes are based on national
accounts data and hence refer to total (intra
plus extra) real exports of goods and services.
In order to assess the relative importance of
factors included in the models, a “contribution
analysis” was carried out which calculates the
relative contributions of the individual
explanatory variables and the residuals to
Germany France Italy Spain Netherlands Euro area UK US Japan
1993 -6.9 -0.7 7.3 8.1 2.2 -1.2 6.4 0.2 -7
1994 -0.9 -1.1 1.5 7.1 -1.7 4.1 0.3 0.1 -3.2
1995 -2.4 -0.1 3.2 1.5 -0.4 -1.4 1.7 7.7 0.3
1996 0.7 -2.1 -5.9 5.6 -0.4 -3.1 3.4 -0.2 -0.3
1997 1.3 1.9 -2.4 4.4 0.1 1.6 -1.1 1.3 1.9
1998 0.1 1.2 -3.1 -0.2 -0.5 0.1 -4.4 -0.2 -1.5
1999 -0.8 -2.8 -6.2 0.1 -1.5 -3.2 -3 -3.9 -9
2000 2.3 2.2 -2.3 0.4 0 0.6 -2.3 -4.1 -4
2001 3.7 0.2 -0.4 2.1 -0.1 3.3 2.8 -3.5 -2.4
2002 1 0.6 -4.9 -1 -0.3 -0.5 -1.4 -4.8 1.9
2003 -2 -6.2 -7.8 1.8 -3.2 -5.0 -3.2 -2.6 2.9
Cumulated change
(1992-2003) 2.9 -6.3 -25.4 23.7 -7.8 -4.9 -7.3 -10.3 -13.1
Table 3 Annual changes in real market shares
(percentages)
Source: ECB computations based on national accounts, Eurostat and IMF data.
Note: For the countries belonging to the euro area, the market share refers to the total of goods and services.
export growth. The results for the euro area and
its five largest countries are shown in the
following charts, while the interpretation of
these results is described at the end of the main
text of Chapter 1.83
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ANNEX 1
Chart 1 Contribution analysis for the Multi-Country Models
Germany
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO CHAPTER 2
The CMSA formulation applied in this work
decomposes the variation in the aggregate
export market share of the euro area between




– percentage change in euro area (world)
exports, in period t
– share of product i to destination market j in
total euro area (world) exports, in period t-1
– being gij (g*
ij) the percentage change in euro
area (world) exports of product i to
destination market j, in period t
The first term in square brackets in equation (1)
is the structure effect. It will be positive if the
euro area’s export structure is more
concentrated on high-growth products/markets
than the world structure. This effect can be
decomposed into three terms:
– product effect =
– market effect =
– mixed structure effect  = residual =
where:
– share of product i in total euro area (world)
exports, in period t-1
– share of market j in total euro area (world)
exports, in period t-1
– growth of world exports of product i
(market j), in period t
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The  mixed structure effect is a residual
and its interpretation is not completely
straightforward. Given that it is not possible
to completely dissociate product and
geographical structures, the residual will
comprise the interaction effects between them.
The fact that the two structures are not
independently distributed, i.e. for a specific
product (market) the geographical (sectoral)
distribution of exports differs from the
geographical (sectoral) distribution of total
exports , is one of the factors
affecting the magnitude of this effect.
The second term in square brackets in equation
(1) is the competitiveness or “pure” market
share effect. It gives the aggregated impact of
changes in market shares of each product/
destination market63.
The CMSA has several limitations that have
been pointed out in the literature64, mainly
related to its empirical implementation.
Although some aspects of the technique have
( )
* * *    e.g. j i ij θ θ θ ≠
63 The competitiveness effect for a specific product i (market j)
can be taken as the sum over j (i) of this effect.
64 An influential contribution about the shortcomings of the
traditional formulation of the CMSA is J. Richardson (1971a),
“Constant market share analysis of export growth”, Journal
of International Economics 1, pp. 227-239 and (1971b)
“Some sensitivity tests for a constant market share analysis of
export growth”, Review of Economics and Statistics 53(3),
pp. 301-304.86
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been refined65, important limitations remain,
namely the fact that results can vary
substantially depending on some of the
empirical choices that have to be made.
The CMSA formulation used in this work takes
in some of these refinements and, therefore,
differs slightly from the traditional formulation
used in the literature in the following ways:
i) the CMSA decomposition is applied over
discrete time periods even though the export
structure of any country changes continuously.
However, different aggregation weights can be
chosen to translate the continuous-time into a
discrete-time decomposition formula66  (i.e. the
index problem number). Traditionally, studies
have used the structure of the initial year in the
calculation of the structural effect and
therefore the competitiveness effect is affected
by changes in structure that occurred between
the initial and the final year under analysis.
This is also the case in the formulation used
here but calculations are performed annually in
order to restrain this problem, as the structure is
less likely to change appreciably over such
short time spans;
ii) in the traditional CMSA formulation the
product and the market effects are calculated in
an asymmetric way67. Depending on the
calculation sequence of these two effects either
the product or the market effect will include the
interaction effect that we called the mixed
structure effect68. The solution adopted here is
to calculate and present this interaction effect
explicitly.
DATABASE USED
The database used for the CMSA is the World
Trade Analyzer (WTA), which is a
merchandise trade flows database compiled by
Statistics Canada from data reported by
member countries to the United Nations
Statistical Office. The WTA database provides
annual data, in value terms (expressed in USD),
for more than 180 countries and more than 800
products at the Standard International Trade
Classification (SITC Rev. 2) 4-digit level. Data
is available for the period 1985-2001. Statistics
Canada adjusts for the discrepancies in the
reporting of each transaction (i.e. between
reported exports and imports) in order to have a
single-valued array.
PRODUCT DISAGGREGATION
The CMSA computations are performed using
the SITC at the 3-digit level, excluding
“Mineral fuels, lubricants and related
materials” (SITC 3) and “Commodities and
transactions n.e.s.” (SITC 9). This corresponds
to around 280 products and approximately 95%
of total euro area exports. For analytical
purposes, this product disaggregation is
mapped into 12 broad sectors, using a
correspondence between the SITC and the
International Standard Industrial
Classification (ISIC). These are then classified
into three sectors according to their
technological intensity (high, medium and
low), as shown in Table 1.
65 See, for instance, J. Fagerberg and G. Sollie (1987), “The
method of constant market share analysis reconsidered”,
Applied Economics 19, pp. 1571-1583, and D. Simonis
(2000), “Belgium’s export performance: a constant market
share analysis”, Federal Planning Bureau WP2-00. For a
review of the alternative formulations used in regional
economics, see S. Loveridge and A. Selting (1998), “A review
and comparison of shift-share identities”, International
Regional Science Review 21(1), pp. 37-58.
66 See J. Richardson (1971a).
67 See J. Richardson (1971b).
68 Using the traditional formulation in the literature, equation
(1) would become:
(product effect computed in the first place)
or
(market effect computed in the first place)
()   g g θ g θ g θ g g θ g g
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ANNEX II
Broad sectors Technological intensity
FOD Food, beverages and tobacco Low-tech / resource based
TEX Textile, leather apparel and leather industries Low-tech / resource based
WOD Wood and wood products, including furniture Low-tech / resource based
PAP Paper and paper products, printing and publishing Low-tech
MNM Non-metallic mineral products, etc. Low-tech
BMI Basic metal industries Low-tech
BMA Fabricated metal products, except machinery and transport equipment Low-tech
CHE Chemical products, rubber and plastic products Medium-tech
MAI Manufacture of agricultural and industrial machinery, except electrical machinery Medium-tech
MTR Manufacture of transport equipment Medium-tech
MIO Professional, scientific, measuring and controlling equipment n.e.c.,
photographic and optical goods, office and data processing machines High-tech
MEL Manufacture of electrical machinery, apparatus, appliances and supplies High-tech
Source: Anderton (1999).
Note: Exports include both manufactured and non-manufactured products. These categories are based on the following 2-digit SITC
codes: FOD (00, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 11, 12), TEX (61, 65, 83, 84, 85), WOD (63, 82), PAP (64), MNM (66), BMI (67,
68), BMA (69), MAI (71, 72, 73, 74), MTR (78, 79), MIO (75, 87, 88), MEL (76, 77).
Table 1  Export classification by product
Countries
Canada, China, Japan, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
Regions:
Africa CEEC& Developed Middle Oceania Other Other Other
Russia Asia East American countries Asian European
countries countries
Algeria Madagascar Albania Hong Kong Afghanistan Australia Argentina Mexico Bangladesh Denmark
Angola Malawi Bulgaria Indonesia Bahrain Fiji Bahamas Neth Bhutan Gibraltar
Antilles
Benin Mali Cyprus Korea Rp Fm Dem Kiribati Barbados Nicaragua Brunei Iceland
Yemen
Br Ind Oc Tr Mauritania Czech Malaysia Fm Yemen New Belize Panama Cambodia Malta
Republic Caledonia
Burkina Faso Mauritius Slovakia Philippines Iran New Bermuda Paraguay India Norway
Zealand
Burundi Morocco Russian Singapore Iraq Papua Bolivia Peru Korea Sweden
federation N Guinea D P Rp
Cameroon Mozambique Fm Taiwan Israel Solomon Brazil St Kitts Laos
Yugoslavia/ Islds Nev P Dem R
Central Afr Rep Niger successors Thailand Jordan Cayman St Pierre Maldives
Islds Miqu
Chad Nigeria Hungary Kuwait Chile Suriname Mongolia
Comoros Reunion Poland Lebanon Colombia Trinidad Myanmar
Tbg
Congo Rwanda Romania Oman Costa Rica Turks Nepal
Caicos Isl
Congo Dem Rep Senegal Turkey Qatar Cuba Uruguay Pakistan
Côte D’Ivoire Seychelles Saudi Arabia Dominican Rp Venezuela Sri Lanka
Djibouti Sierra Leone Syrn Arab Rp Ecuador Vietnam
Egypt Somalia Untd Arab Em El Salvador
Eq Guinea South Africa Yemen Falkland Isl
Ethiopia St Helena French Guiana









Table 2 Export classification by destination market
Source: ECB classification.88
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Table 3 Technological content of exports
(as a percentage of total, average of period 2000-01)
World Euro area US Japan China UK
Low-tech 31.1 28.3 22.5 11.6 46.6 21.6
Medium-tech 34.8 46.5 43.7 50.8 17.5 46.9
High-tech 29.1 20.4 31.3 36.6 29.7 25.9
Sources: WTA, ECB calculations.
Note: Exports to selected 14 destinations, excluding SITC 3 and 9. For the definition of technological content, see Table 1 of
Annex II.
            Exporting countries World Euro area US Japan China UK
Importing countries
Euro area 29 50 15 12 13 53
China 4 1 2801
Japan 52 8 0 1 6 2
UK 5 1 0 5320
USA 19 9 0 30 22 15
Developed Asia 12 4 14 31 30 5
Other 26 25 55 16 15 24
Table 4 Direction of trade
(as a percentage of total, average of period 2000-01)
Sources: WTA, ECB calculations.
Note: Exports to selected 14 destinations and euro area, excluding SITC 3 and 9. For the description of the classification by
destination market, see Table 2 of Annex II.
GEOGRAPHICAL DISAGGREGATION
The CMSA calculations consider 14
destination markets comprising the above
6 individual countries and 8 geographical areas
(covering around 160 countries) that represent
approximately 95% of total euro area exports.89
ECB




ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO CHAPTER 3
PART 1
Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Euro area UK US Japan All
1980-1984
Low 12.7 11.7 11.8 14.6 11.3 12.7 13.4 8.9 12.5
Medium 43.2 53.2 70.6 53.8 54.6 52.5 44.8 40.7 46.5
High 39.7 21.3 5.9 20.6 28.9 28.7 32.6 45.8 33.2
1985-1989
Low 9.1 13.9 14.8 12.4 10.8 12.1 12.9 8.5 11.8
Medium 37.1 50.1 70.4 51.4 49.7 46.3 40.7 36.0 42.2
High 44.9 21.4 7.4 22.7 29.6 35.8 36.5 51.1 37.9
1990-1994
Low 8.5 12.4 31.0 12.6 9.8 10.8 11.9 7.4 10.8
Medium 40.0 46.9 55.2 45.6 51.1 47.9 39.2 32.9 40.3
High 41.7 24.0 13.8 28.7 28.3 35.6 38.7 55.7 40.7
1995-1999
Low 7.1 13.9 12.5 8.1 8.6 8.9 9.5 6.1 8.8
Medium 32.8 46.6 31.3 37.1 47.4 44.9 34.6 27.1 35.3
High 46.2 22.3 40.6 41.2 31.2 40.2 46.1 63.1 47.9
2000-2002
Low 7.4 12.4 11.1 6.1 8.7 8.3 8.5 6.1 8.2
Medium 33.6 45.0 44.4 29.8 44.8 43.3 31.8 26.3 32.8
High 43.3 27.8 38.9 49.9 33.8 42.2 51.0 64.3 51.9
Table 1 Patents according to technological intensity (cont’)
(expressed as a share of the individual economy’s total patents)
Belgium Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg
1980-1984
Low 12.7 10.5 24.2 19.6 12.6 11.4 9.6 35.0
Medium 57.7 56.9 57.6 53.3 49.6 43.8 60.0 50.4
High 23.5 28.0 9.1 14.4 32.5 36.2 23.9 13.7
1985-1989
Low 12.0 10.6 9.1 13.7 11.9 14.0 8.7 19.9
Medium 56.2 53.1 63.6 53.2 42.4 36.7 52.8 67.9
High 26.0 27.9 18.2 16.3 34.3 35.8 24.3 9.0
1990-1994
Low 10.3 9.8 11.5 12.9 10.2 6.5 8.4 21.8
Medium 55.9 55.1 34.4 50.0 44.1 36.6 55.8 66.1
High 26.0 26.4 32.8 19.1 32.9 37.9 22.8 11.3
1995-1999
Low 7.4 8.8 8.6 10.7 8.8 8.0 7.7 21.2
Medium 51.0 52.6 36.6 47.8 40.9 23.2 50.5 64.6
High 33.6 28.6 34.4 20.5 34.3 46.0 27.5 8.8
2000-2002
Low 8.3 9.2 11.7 10.8 8.3 6.1 8.1 16.4
Medium 52.3 48.7 36.4 39.8 41.3 21.8 45.5 62.9
High 32.5 32.1 22.1 27.7 34.5 50.3 32.7 12.1
Table 1 Patents according to technological intensity
(expressed as a share of the individual economy’s total patents)
Source: ECB computations based on USPTO data.
Source: ECB computations based on USPTO data.90
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Belgium Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg
1980-1984
Low 5.4 12.9 6.8 28.7 5.0
Medium 63.0 64.7 60.2 37.0 64.6
High 31.6 22.4 33.0 34.3 30.4
1985-1989
Low 12.2 5.4 12.9 6.7 27.3 5.3
Medium 54.0 60.9 57.8 59.6 26.8 61.9
High 33.8 33.7 29.3 33.7 45.9 32.7
1990-1994
Low 14.0 5.5 11.5 7.5 21.3 5.3
Medium 57.5 61.8 57.9 60.6 32.8 61.0
High 25.4 32.7 30.6 32.0 45.9 33.7
1995-1999
Low 14.5 5.4 14.4 7.9 16.8 5.1
Medium 61.0 69.6 61.0 61.2 29.1 60.4
High 24.5 24.9 24.6 30.9 54.1 34.6
2000-2002
Low 14.8 5.3 16.4 7.8 5.4
Medium 59.1 72.2 61.3 61.8 61.1
High 26.1 22.5 22.3 30.4 33.5
Table 2 R&D expenditure according to technological intensity
(expressed as a share of the individual economy’s total R&D)
Source: OECD ANBERD database.
Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Euro area UK US Japan
1980-1984
Low 8.3 17.4 6.2 7.6 5.4 15.1
Medium 46.7 46.6 61.0 54.5 56.4 47.6
High 45.0 36.0 32.8 37.9 38.3 37.3
1985-1989
Low 9.0 16.4 6.5 6.9 5.4 14.9
Medium 42.9 48.3 58.9 60.8 58.1 44.1
High 48.1 35.3 34.6 32.3 36.5 41.0
1990-1994
Low 12.0 17.6 7.1 6.7 5.9 13.5
Medium 50.4 42.4 60.1 69.0 56.6 44.9
High 37.6 40.0 32.8 24.3 37.5 41.6
1995-1999
Low 12.9 13.6 7.4 6.2 6.1 11.5
Medium 46.2 28.2 63.2 72.8 51.6 44.1
High 41.0 58.2 29.4 21.0 42.3 44.4
2000-2002
Low 12.5 10.0 7.3 5.3 6.5 9.6
Medium 44.9 23.5 64.3 72.5 47.5 43.6
High 42.6 66.5 28.4 22.2 46.0 46.8
Table 2 R&D expenditure according to technological intensity (cont’)
(expressed as a share of the individual economy’s total R&D)
Source: OECD ANBERD database.91
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 30
June 2005
ANNEX III
Belgium Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg
1980-1984
Low 1.2 0.2 0.7 0.2
Medium 8.3 1.5 8.4 3.4
High 10.1 1.7 16.6 4.7
Total 5.4 0.7 5.1 1.6
1985-1989
Low 0.8 1.1 0.3 0.9 0.5 0.3
Medium 4.3 9.5 2.2 10.5 4.7
High 1.0 11.4 4.9 17.3 7.4
Total 5.1 6.4 1.2 6.1 1.7 2.3
1990-1994
Low 1.4 1.0 0.4 1.1 1.1 0.3
Medium 7.8 10.1 3.2 13.0 2.7 5.3
High 10.5 12.0 7.1 20.1 12.4 9.2
Total 5.3 6.5 1.8 7.3 2.5 2.7
1995-1999
Low 1.8 1.0 0.5 1.2 1.5 0.2
Medium 8.8 10.9 3.4 11.7 2.9 4.0
High 17.0 12.6 6.3 18.4 12.4 8.1
Total 5.9 7.0 1.9 7.1 2.7 2.2
2000-2001
Low 1.9 0.8 0.6 1.0 0.2
Medium 9.5 12.6 3.0 11.0 4.2
High 20.2 11.1 6.6 17.5 10.4
Total 7.3 7.7 1.8 6.9 2.3
Table 3 R&D intensity according to technological intensity
(percentages)
Source: OECD STAN and ANBERD databases.
Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Euro area UK US Japan
1980-1984
Low 0.9 1.2 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.8
Medium 8.0 4.1 6.9 8.5 13.0 6.8
High 2.8 12.2 10.5 17.8 19.6 12.9
Total 5.0 2.8 4.0 5.9 8.3 5.1
1985-1989
Low 1.1 1.5 0.8 0.8 1.2 2.4
Medium 8.2 6.5 8.2 9.3 14.8 8.6
High 11.2 14.8 12.1 14.1 19.9 15.5
Total 6.2 4.2 4.9 5.6 9.3 6.7
1990-1994
Low 1.2 2.2 0.8 0.8 1.2 2.4
Medium 8.3 7.1 9.2 10.7 12.6 9.8
High 18.3 19.3 13.9 11.5 18.0 17.3
Total 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.7 8.2 7.5
1995-1999
Low 1.4 1.8 0.9 0.7 1.3 2.5
Medium 7.5 7.4 9.1 10.6 11.7 10.6
High 23.1 23.7 13.9 8.4 20.8 19.5
Total 5.3 7.1 5.4 5.3 8.6 8.5
2000-2001
Low 1.2 1.7 0.7 0.7 1.3 1.7
Medium 7.7 8.4 9.9 12.4 10.6 11.3
High 24.2 22.9 13.3 9.8 21.4 20.7
Total 5.7 9.1 5.8 6.4 8.5 9.6
Table 3 R&D intensity according to technological intensity (cont’)
(percentages)
Source: OECD STAN and ANBERD databases.92
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Belgium Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy
1) Legal and institutional framework 3.6 3.4 3.5 4.6 3.4 5.8 2.7
Adaptability of government policy 4.3 3.6 4.2 5.6 4.0 6.3 3.6
Bureaucracy 3.1 3.1 1.8 3.6 2.8 4.9 1.7
Labor regulations 3.2 2.7 4.1 3.5 2.8 5.9 2.8
Political parties 3.9 4.3 4.0 5.7 3.9 6.0 2.6
2) Image of the country 7.9 7.9 7.4 7.3 6.9 8.4 7.0
Cross-border transactions 8.5 8.9 8.1 8.0 7.6 9.0 7.5
Foreign investors 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.4 7.7 9.1 8.1
Values of the society 6.5 5.9 5.3 5.5 5.2 7.1 5.3
3) Tax system 2.8 3.2 4.4 4.7 3.4 5.7 3.3
Real personal taxes 2.0 2.7 4.4 4.4 3.0 4.6 3.5
Real corporate taxes 3.6 3.7 4.4 4.9 3.7 6.8 3.2
4) Production infrastructure 6.7 6.7 4.5 5.4 6.1 6.4 4.3
Distribution infrastructure 7.5 8.6 5.1 6.4 8.2 5.4 4.2
Educational system 6.5 5.2 3.6 5.0 5.1 7.5 3.7
Worker motivation 6.2 6.2 4.7 4.9 5.1 6.4 4.9
Total 5.3 5.3 4.9 5.5 4.9 6.6 4.2
Table 4 Business environment
(averages for 1994-2004)
Sources: IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, various issues.
Note: The ranking is on a 1-10 scale, with 1 indicating a negative perception and 10 the most positive perception. The total is obtained
as the simple average of the individual factors. See Table 6 below which gives full details of the WCY survey questions.
Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Euro area Main
competitors
1) Legal and institutional framework 5.3 5.2 4.7 3.9 5.9 3.7 5.2
Adaptability of government policy 6.4 5.9 5.5 4.8 6.2 4.3 5.1
Bureaucracy 4.8 4.7 3.5 2.3 6.4 3.0 4.3
Labor regulations 4.0 4.3 4.4 3.6 4.7 3.2 6.4
Political parties 6.2 5.9 5.3 5.0 6.4 4.3 4.9
2) Image of the country 8.1 8.1 8.1 7.2 8.5 7.5 7.7
Cross-border transactions 8.9 8.8 9.1 8.2 9.0 8.3 8.0
Foreign investors 8.9 8.8 8.8 7.9 8.9 8.4 8.0
Values of the society 6.5 6.7 6.5 5.6 7.6 5.7 7.0
3) Tax system 5.5 4.9 5.2 4.2 4.3 3.7 5.7
Real personal taxes 5.2 4.0 4.4 4.3 2.5 3.3 5.5
Real corporate taxes 5.7 5.8 5.9 4.2 6.2 4.1 5.9
4) Production infrastructure 6.6 6.7 7.4 4.8 7.6 6.0 6.3
Distribution infrastructure 7.8 7.5 8.2 5.9 8.6 7.2 7.4
Educational system 5.4 6.1 6.9 3.7 7.5 5.1 4.9
Worker motivation 6.5 6.6 7.2 4.9 6.8 5.6 6.4
Total 6.4 6.2 6.3 5.0 6.7 5.2 6.2
Table 4 Business environment (cont’)
(averages for 1994-2004)
Sources: IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, various issues.
Note: The ranking is on a 1-10 scale, with 1 indicating a negative perception and 10 the most positive perception. The total is obtained
as the simple average of the individual factors. See Table 6 below which gives full details of the WCY survey questions.93
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PATENT AND R&D DATA
PATENT DATA
The patent data cover US utility patents (i.e.
patents for inventions) granted in the United
States during the period from 1963 to 2002 (plant
and design patents are not included), which are
collected by the US Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO). Although a strong “home country
advantage” effect is present in the data – i.e. the
number of patents registered by US companies is
generally much higher than that by foreign
companies – the overall trends depicted by the
data are comparable to other datasets. According
to the European Patent Office (EPO), which
collects data on patents registered in Europe, the
euro area has the highest share of patents
registered at the EPO (see REIST-3), but the
United States has increased its presence over the
past decade in terms of the percentage of patent
applications filed at the EPO. In 2001, the euro
area was responsible for 33.9% of patents
applied for at the EPO, while the United States
accounted for 32.4% and Japan for 14.6%. Over
the period from 1992 to 2001, the United States
managed to increase its share by 4.2 percentage
points, while the euro area’s share fell by 2.1
percentage points and Japan’s by 4.9 percentage
points. These are similar trends to those
described by the USPTO dataset.
R&D DATA
The R&D data are from the OECD STAN
Indicators database, which includes annual
data on R&D intensity, measured as the share
of R&D expenditure in value added. This
indicator has been computed using the value-
added data from the OECD STAN database for
Industrial Analysis and R&D expenditure from
the Analytical Business Enterprise R&D
(ANBERD) Database. The industrial
breakdown is based on the International
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC)
Revision 3 and the data are available for eight
euro area countries: Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and
Spain. The data for these countries are
weighted together to approximate R&D
measures for the euro area (using the weight of
each country in euro area value added).
Moreover, this source also provides data for
Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Australia,
Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and the
United States. These data are available for the
period 1987-2001. For previous periods (1980-
86), the OECD Main Industrial Indicators
database was used, adjusted using the
correspondence between ISIC Rev. 2 and ISIC
Rev. 3 classifications. This earlier dataset
includes information for the same set of
countries, except for Belgium and Ireland.
EA US UK Japan South Korea Singapore
EA 28,6 58,0 26,5 22,9 21,7
US 25,1 16,7 36,3 25,6 24,4
UK 24,3 6,6 5,7 4,2 5,4
Japan 15,0 23,7 8,5 29,9 27,7
Switzerland 8,8 1,8 3,1 1,7 1,3 1,5
Sweden 6,2 1,5 2,9 1,5 1,1 1,2
South Korea 4,9 5,6 2,1 10,0
Hong Kong 3,9 3,0 1,7 5,9 6,0 6,8
Denmark 3,5 0,5 1,4 0,5 0,5 0,4
Singapore 3,5 4,0 2,0 6,7 4,6 0,0
Canada 2,0 23,1 1,5 2,6 1,9 1,5
Norway 1,7 0,3 1,2 0,4 0,4 0,4
Australia 1,1 1,4 1,0 2,3 1,7 2,0
Source: ECB.
Note: Table should be read in columns, i.e. for RPIEA, the US carries a weight of 25.1% etc.; EA is the euro area.
Table 5 Weights for the relative patenting indicator94
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RELATIVE PATENTING INDICATOR (RPI)
Based on the computations used in calculating
National Competitiveness Indicators (NCI), a
similar indicator was derived for the relative
patenting activity of the euro area as a whole,
which is defined as:
where PATEA stands for the number of patents of
the euro area, and PATi for the number of
patents of competitor i, both registered in the
United States. As for the NCI, the “narrow
group” of competitors was used, namely the
United States, the United Kingdom, Japan,
Switzerland, Sweden, South Korea, Hong
Kong, Denmark, Singapore, Canada, Norway
and Australia (i.e. n=12). The weights are the
same as those used in the NCI computation,
appropriately adjusted for the euro area (see
Table 5). The RPI was then computed for each
member of the narrow group.
NATIONAL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTS AND
COMPETITIVENESS
The detailed survey questions used in the
World Competitiveness Report shown in
Table 10 in Chapter 3 are shown below:95
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ANNEX III
Area Criterion Applicable for the survey of the year... Question
1. Government policy Adaptability of government 2004 Adaptability of government policy to
changes in the economy is high
Government economic policy 2002, 2003 Government economic policies adapt quickly
to changes in the economy
Government economic policy 1999, 2000, 2001 Gov. economic policies adapts its policies to
changes in the economic environment
Government economic policy 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 The government adapts its policies to new
economic realities effectively
2. Bureaucracy Bureaucracy 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004 Bureaucracy does not hinder business activity
Bureaucracy 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001 Bureaucracy does not hinder business
development
3. Labor Labor regulations 1999, 2004 Labor regulations do not hinder business
activities
Labor regulations 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Labor regulations are flexible enough
Hiring and firing practices 1994, 1995, 1996 Hiring and firing practices are flexible enough
4. Politics Political parties 2002, 2003, 2004 Political parties do understand today’s
economic challenges
Political system 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, Political system is well adapted to
2000, 2001 today’s economic challenges
5. Cross-border Cross-border transactions 2004 Cross-border transactions can be freely
operations negotiated with foreign partners
Cross border ventures 2002, 2003 Cross border ventures can be freely
negotiated with foreign partners
Cross-border transactions 1999, 2000, 2001 Cross-border ventures can be negotiated
with foreign partners without government
intervention
Cross border ventures 1998 Cross-border ventures can be negotiated with
foreign partners without government
imposed restraint
Cross border ventures 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 Cross border ventures can be negotiated freely
6. Foreign investors 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, Foreign investors are free to acquire
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 control in domestic companies
7. Values of the society Values of the society 1998, 2002, 2003, 2004 Values of the society support
competitiveness
Values of the society 1999, 2000, 2001 Values of the society (hard work, innovation)
support competitiveness
Values of the society 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 Values of the society support
competitiveness (such as hard work,...)
8. Personal taxes Real personal taxes 2002, 2003, 2004 Real personal taxes do not discourage people
from working or seeking advancement
Real personal taxes 2000, 2001 Real personal taxes do not discourage people
from working
Real personal taxes 1998, 1999 Real personal taxes encourage individual
work initiative
Personal taxes 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 Personal taxes encourage individual work
initiative
9. Corporate taxes Real corporate taxes 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 Real corporate taxes do not discourage
entrepreneurial activity
Real corporate taxes 1998, 1999 Real corporate taxes encourage
entrepreneurial activity
Corporate taxes 1997 Corporate taxes encourage entrepreneurial
activity
Fiscal policy 1994, 1995, 1996 Fiscal policy encourages entrepeneurial
activity
10. Distribution Distribution infrastructure 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, The distribution infrastructure of goods
2002, 2003, 2004 and services is generally efficient
Distribution systems 1994, 1995 Distribution systems are generally efficient
11. Educational Educational system 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, Educational system meets the needs of a
system 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 competitive economy
12. Worker motivation Worker motivation 2002, 2003, 2004 Worker motivation is high in your country
Worker motivation 1999, 2000, 2001 Employees do identify with company
objectives
Worker motivation 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Employees truly identify with company
objectives
Table 6 Survey questions used in the World Competitiveness Yearbook96
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